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Preface 
 
When Vernon Smith and Daniel Kahneman, two pre-eminent figures of the “experimental 
revolution in economics”, were awarded the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in 
Memory of Alfred Nobel in 2002, the field of behavioral and experimental economics had 
finally received the highest recognition within the economics profession. The former of the 
two was honored “for having established laboratory experiments as a tool in empirical 
economic analysis” and the latter “for having integrated insights from psychological research 
into economic science, especially concerning human judgment and decision-making under 
uncertainty.” Building upon the methodological developments of Vernon Smith and the 
psychological insights of Daniel Kahneman and the late Amos Tversky is at the heart of this 
doctoral dissertation in economics. 
Conducting a laboratory experiment can have a variety of objectives. In one of the first 
monographs entirely devoted to experimental economics, Davis and Holt (1992) categorized 
them as (i) tests of behavioral hypotheses, (ii) theory stress tests, and (iii) searching for 
empirical regularities. The main advantage of experiments over real world data is that 
potentially confounding factors can be isolated and eliminated or controlled for. However, 
there are situations where experiments are not only a cleaner way of obtaining relevant data, 
but maybe even the only viable way to investigate a specific hypothesis. One example is 
research on behaviors which are generally considered morally objectionable or violate formal 
or informal rules. Observing them in the field is difficult for the very reason that people 
wouldn’t behave in this way if they knew that they were being observed. The anonymity of 
the laboratory greatly reduces reputation or punishment concerns due to being caught doing 
something morally wrong. 
The research questions which motivated the first three chapters fall into the category of 
behavioral regularities which would be difficult to observe directly in real-world 
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environments. These chapters study violations of social norms, such as lying, cheating, and 
opportunism and corruption. In contrast, the main focus of the fourth chapter is on risk 
aversion, which is a morally neutral expression of individual preferences. People can be either 
more or less afraid of taking risks, but in most situations there is no incentive for concealing 
it. The reason why an experimental approach is useful in this context is that most people 
would not be able to give an objective and unbiased assessment of their own aversion to risk 
which would be interpersonally comparable. This is what we can obtain with experimental 
measures for risk attitudes.  
In the first chapter, which is joint work with Daniel Houser and Joachim Winter, I investigate 
whether people lie and cheat more often when they have the impression that others do not 
treat them fairly. Understanding why people behave dishonestly is an important question 
given the widespread occurrence of cheating and fraud in various aspects of our daily lives. 
Related real world situations to our laboratory setting are for example employee theft, free-
riding on public transport, tax evasion, and many more. However, even if such acts of 
cheating are discovered there is no information about the role of perceived unfairness. If we 
are interested in uncovering a causal link between the (un)fair behavior of others and an 
individual’s propensity to cheat, economic experiments are a promising alternative. 
As lying and cheating violate one of the arguably strongest social norms, namely the 
imperative of being honest, we were aware that traditional approaches would entail the 
drawback that subjects feel observed by the experimenter. This may not be a major reason for 
concern in most experiments, but a design which investigates why people break a social norm 
so central to our societies that more severe violations are even legally punished led us to look 
for a new approach. 
To ensure that subjects could cheat without being observed – and thus without the threat of 
being held accountable – we implemented a design in which not even the experimenter can 
observe cheating directly. Subjects could flip a coin in private and report the result either 
truthfully or untruthfully. If they claimed to have flipped tails, whether true or not, they 
received an additional monetary reward. We implemented different perceptions of fairness 
across subjects by pairing them in a dictator game. The idea is that a receiver who was paired 
with a selfish dictator presumably experienced much stronger feelings of unfairness than 
another receiver who was paired with a dictator who split the endowment equally. 
PREFACE 
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Our results show that the perception of how others adhere to the norm of being fair affects the 
decision to cheat. To exclude other possible explanations for our data (e.g. income targeting 
or a desire to reduce peer inequality among receivers) we conducted a “no intentions” 
treatment in which we implemented the same degree of inequality as in the dictator game, but 
assigned earnings randomly. As the cheating rate in this treatment without unfair dictator 
intentions is not related to earnings, we are confident that our main treatment really measures 
the effect of fairness on an individual’s inclination to cheat. 
The second chapter presents a related study on lying behavior. This time the research question 
is whether people are more dishonest when they can hide behind a veil of ignorance about the 
consequences of their lies. To this aim, I conducted an experiment in which subjects 
interacted in pairs and one player (the sender) had to send a message to the other player (the 
receiver). The sender could either lie or tell the truth, and by successfully deceiving his 
counterpart he could increase his earnings from the experiment. This setup, introduced by 
Gneezy (2005) and Sutter (2009), allows us to evaluate an individual’s inclination to engage 
in deception. In this case, the link between a lie and a bad outcome for the other person is 
clear. In a second step, I conducted a responsibility treatment in which there were two senders 
for each receiver, but only one of their messages was transmitted to the receiver. As none of 
the senders would later know whether it was their own dishonest action or the lie of the other 
sender which led to a detrimental outcome for the receiver, the moral costs of lying might be 
lower. A sender might justify his lie vis-à-vis herself with the possibility that the other sender 
could still tell the truth. What we find, however, is that people do not lie more frequently 
when they remain ignorant about the consequences of their truth-telling behavior.  
This result is in contrast to the multiple dictator treatment of Dana et al. (2007) who find that 
people are strikingly less generous in a dictator game when there is the possibility that another 
dictator’s choice may decide the amount to be shared. However, keeping in mind that lying is 
generally considered far more objectionable than not sharing equally, people might evaluate a 
violation of the honesty norm differently than a violation of the fairness/sharing norm. Instead 
of focusing on the consequences, as argued by Gneezy (2005), they might be more concerned 
about the act of lying per se. 
The third chapter deals with opportunism and corruption, which is another issue where 
experiments are particularly useful because there is often no viable way of obtaining objective 
data for the question of interest. The enormous political relevance of this topic, even in 
developed countries with generally well-functioning legal systems and a high rule of law, is 
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underscored for example by the fact that the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development (OECD) has initiated an Anti-Bribery Convention and runs a special Working 
Group on Bribery. 
Opportunities for corruption can occur in many different scenarios. We focus on situations in 
which a decision-maker is supposed to act for the benefit of the public, but where there are 
various parties which pursue their own interests in the context of this decision. Such a 
situation can be found for example when politicians or public officials have to make decisions 
about procurement contracts, or when politicians are deciding about legislative changes which 
benefit one lobbying party at the expense of another (e.g. an industry-friendly vs. a consumer-
friendly legislation). In such cases, a bidder in a procurement auction or a political lobby 
group would have a material interest in bribing decision-makers to ensure that their preferred 
outcome will be achieved. Vice versa, a corruptible decision-maker may be willing to 
exchange a favorable decision against a (usually monetary) reward.  
These activities are obviously illegal and, if discovered, may entail a severe punishment for 
either side. Therefore, they are carried out in a clandestine way and hardly anyone would 
readily admit to be involved in a bribery relationship. The fundamental problem for an 
economic analysis is therefore the lack of credible data, but experiments can offer a way out. 
Early corruption experiments, e.g. Abbink et al. (2002), have shown that when situations with 
the possibility of bribing a decision-maker are replicated in the laboratory, subjects respond to 
the same incentives as the parties involved in corruption deals in the real world. This suggests 
that we can use the laboratory to investigate corrupt behaviors and to make causal statements 
about the motives for corruption.  
Bribery occurs because it allows both the decision-maker and the lobbying party to reap 
benefits, usually to the detriment of the general public. However, it also has an important and 
obvious drawback for the partners-in-crime – it is illegal. In countries where the rule of law is 
very weak or an authoritarian regime protects its henchmen, this may not be much reason for 
concern. In most Western democracies, however, the punishment for being corrupt can be 
heavy, and even the shadow of a doubt can effectively terminate a political career. It would 
thus not be surprising if potential bribers and bribees were interesting in finding alternative 
channels for exchanging favorable decisions for money.  
In the classical corruption scenario, the potential briber offers money in exchange for a 
political favor. However, if the order of moves is reversed, it is much easier to obscure the 
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link between the favor and the reward. In other words, a decision-maker may do a favor pro-
actively and anticipate that he will be rewarded for it in the future. After all, there are 
numerous ways of transferring money to former political decision-makers, such as making 
them members of the company’s management, hiring them for mandates, inviting them for 
speeches, and many more. What all these cases have in common is that there are perfectly 
legitimate reasons why a firm would want to do this (e.g. benefitting from the knowledge, 
experience or the contacts of the decision-maker), which are difficult to disentangle from the 
motive of rewarding a previous favor. It would thus be almost impossible to prove that a 
monetary payment was made out of gratitude for an unethical act. However, this strategy also 
has a crucial drawback – the future reward is not contractible. Whether such an arrangement 
would actually work is therefore a-priori unclear.  
The results show that such an implicit collusion can actually work. When subjects know that 
there is a possibility of being rewarded for previous decisions, they clearly favor the party that 
has more to gain and is thus more likely to reward. The favored party often reciprocates and 
makes a voluntary financial transfer to the decision-maker. In this way, the two partners in the 
gift vs. reward exchange can increase their earnings at the expense of the discriminated party.  
For the final chapter we leave the confines of an experimental laboratory and demonstrate 
how experimental methods can serve as valuable tools for policy evaluation outside the lab. In 
the early years of experimental economics, there had been skepticism about the usefulness of 
experiments for evaluating policy issues for reasons such as the specificity of the subject pool 
and the particular environment in a laboratory. However, there is no reason for restricting 
ourselves to experiments with students, and for many policy questions it would be highly 
desirable to supplement information contained in surveys with experimental measures of 
individual behavior. Together with Florian Heiss, Daniel McFadden and Joachim Winter, I 
investigate the choice behavior of senior US citizens during the introduction phase of the new 
Medicare Part D program in 2006, using experimental measures of risk aversion and the 
prospect theory framework of Kahneman and Tversky.  
Medicare Part D has often been referred to as the largest expansion in social security 
entitlement programs since the “Great Society” agenda of Lyndon B. Johnson in the mid-
sixties. It offers highly subsidized coverage for prescription drug costs, especially directed to 
those suffering from chronic conditions. This reform was very costly and has thus been 
politically contested since the very beginning. It has also led to a vast body of research about 
the behavioral responses of the eligible population to the introduction of Part D. Most existing 
PREFACE 
6 
 
surveys, e.g. the Health and Retirement Study, extended their questionnaires to incorporate 
additional modules related to the policy reform. The importance of this legislative change 
even initiated an entirely new survey, the Retirement Perspectives Survey, which we used for 
our analysis.  
Part D has the virtue of preserving the freedom to choose whether to opt in or remain without 
coverage. However, the default option was non-enrollment, which creates the concern that not 
all individuals may use their freedom to their own advantage. Especially very old, cognitively 
impaired or socially excluded individuals might fail to realize which benefits they would reap 
from this new program. Understanding who the people that did not enroll are, and which 
motives they had for not enrolling, remains an ongoing discussion and is vital for evaluating 
the workings of Part D.  
At least in terms of enrollment numbers, Medicare Part D has generally been regarded as a 
major success. According to the Centers of Medicare and Medicaid Services there were 
almost 24 million beneficiaries who obtained Part D coverage during the first year until the 
beginning of 2007. This number further increased to more than 31 million until 2011. Most of 
these enrollees had no equivalent coverage for pharmaceutical drugs before Part D. However, 
more than 4 million Medicare beneficiaries lacked prescription drug coverage one year after 
the introduction of Part D, and this number has remained more or less constant since then. 
Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein express their opinion about this issue in their recent book 
Nudge:  “Many people are still not enrolled in this program, even though it is clear that they 
should be. Four million uncovered Americans is a large number, and studies suggest that this 
group is probably dominated by poorly educated people living just above the poverty line 
[…].” However, this may not be the full story. While several empirical studies have 
investigated the determinants of (non-)enrollment into a Part D plan, none of them has 
controlled for a key ingredient of insurance choice: risk aversion. Standard insurance models 
predict that a risk averse individual will always opt for insurance when it is actuarially fair, 
and will generally have more insurance coverage than a risk seeking individual. Our paper 
attempts to close this gap and assess the importance of this possible link. 
With experimental measures of risk aversion in situations involving gains and losses, 
respectively, we conclude that risk tolerance in the loss domain is highly significantly related 
to non-enrollment in Medicare Part D. Perhaps surprisingly, the role of risk aversion seems to 
be more important than various observable indicators for socio-economic status. This does not 
refute the claim that poor or uneducated seniors are overrepresented among those who remain 
PREFACE 
7 
 
outside of the Medicare Part D framework despite the substantial financial benefits. What it 
does suggest, however, is that the problem could be less severe than what has sometimes been 
argued. Focusing exclusively on the number of eligible yet uncovered persons when assessing 
the success of Part D will ignore the role of voluntary abstention due to a relatively high 
degree of risk tolerance. The final chapter shows that this motive plays an important role to 
understand non-enrollment. 
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1 Fairness and Cheating 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Interestingly, not all people who can improve their situation by lying will actually do so. 
Indeed, the rapidly growing literature on cheating (e.g. Gneezy, 2005; Hurkens and Kartig 
2009; Sutter, 2009) reveals a robust finding that a substantial proportion of people prefer not 
to cheat. This preference for honesty endures even in situations when cheating cannot be 
detected by the experimenter (Fischbacher and Heusi, 2008). We focus on perceptions of 
fairness as a possible explanation for this behavior. 
We ask whether individuals who feel they have been treated fairly in an interaction with 
others are less likely to subsequently cheat than those who believe they have been treated 
unfairly. This question is motivated by empirical evidence suggesting that fairness 
perceptions can affect honesty. Greenberg (1990), for example, showed that when employees 
were confronted with a pay cut, theft was significantly higher among the employees who were 
most likely to perceive this measure as unfair. While employee theft involves reciprocity, our 
goal is to investigate this link in a setting where reciprocity and other confounding motives 
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can be controlled. This chapter discusses the laboratory experiments we designed to address 
this issue and the results we obtained.  
In our experiment, cheating occurs when one misreports the outcome of a coin flip to receive 
a greater payoff.  While we did not observe individually whether a particular subject cheated, 
we could observe the distribution of outcomes for sub-samples of subjects who were either 
treated fairly or unfairly. Statistical inference based on the self-reported outcome of a random 
event has been proposed by Warner (1965) as a way of eliminating answer bias in survey 
questions which are of sensitive nature and therefore likely to result in a high proportion of 
untruthful responses. Self-reports of random outcomes have been used by Batson et al. (1997) 
in a psychological experiment, and more recently by Fischbacher and Heusi (2008) as well as 
Bucciol and Piovesan (2011) in the economics context. While Fischbacher and Heusi studied 
the outcome of a die roll, Batson et al. and Bucciol and Piovesan also used a coin flip. Our 
study adds to this experimental device a first stage – the dictator game – to manipulate the 
objective experience of unequal treatment and perceptions of fairness. We further extend 
existing studies by proposing a simple, nonparametric estimator of the fraction of cheaters in 
the underlying population.  
Outside the lab, we rarely encounter situations where people cheat openly. After all, being 
perceived as dishonest is generally considered objectionable (see, e.g., Hao and Houser, 
2011). Moreover, depending on the situation, dishonest actions might lead one to be punished. 
Therefore, cheating mostly occurs when the offender considers the chance to remain 
undetected sufficiently large. By using the self-reported outcome of a random event we thus 
intended to create a more natural environment to study dishonest behavior than in experiments 
in which the researcher can observe cheating directly.  
That experimenter blindness makes a difference has been shown, for example, by Hoffman et 
al. (1994) for the ultimatum game and by Hoffman et al. (1996) for the dictator game. These 
experiments varied the degree of anonymity and demonstrated that when subjects knew that 
the experimenter could not observe individually how much they allocated to another player, 
they behaved by far less pro-social and retained a much larger share for themselves. Given 
that this “double-blind” vs. “single-blind” effect is so pronounced in games which involve 
“fairness” we expect it to be important also in a situation which involves an arguably even 
stronger social norm, namely the norm of being honesty.  
FAIRNESS AND CHEATING 
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In our “fairness” treatment, we investigate whether the amount subjects receive in a dictator 
game affects the probability that they will cheat in a subsequent task. We consider both an 
objective measure of fairness (the amount a subject has received) and a subjective measure 
(the receiver’s assessment of the proposer’s transfer elicited after the dictator game). To 
ensure that “unfair” dictator decisions are salient, we ask receivers for their fairness 
assessment.1   
In order to isolate fairness as an explanation, we implement a “no intentions” treatment where 
receiver earnings are determined by a random mechanism rather than an intentional dictator 
decision.  Additionally, to keep perceptions of unfairness as low as possible, we do not ask 
subjects for their fairness opinion. This treatment allows us to assess the importance of other 
possible cheating motives, such as income-targeting or reducing peer inequality.  
We found that in the “fairness” treatment, 74.5% of our subjects reported the better coin flip 
outcome, which is highly significantly different from the expected proportion of 50%. 
Assuming that subjects with the better outcome reported honestly, this suggests that 49% of 
those who flipped the inferior outcome cheated. What we observe is that cheating rates were 
drastically higher among receivers who earned nothing or who reported feeling like they were 
treated unfairly. In contrast, we do not observe a significant difference in cheating rates across 
earnings in the “no intentions” treatment, where earnings were determined randomly. Our 
results strongly support the idea that experiencing unfair treatment does indeed induce 
subjects to cheat. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 reviews related literature. 
Section 1.3 describes the experimental design of the “fairness” treatment, and section 1.4 
presents the results. Section 1.5 reports design and results for the “no intentions” treatment. 
Section 1.6 concludes with a discussion of our findings.  
 
  
                                                 
1 While drawing inferences about social preferences from proposer decisions in the dictator game has been 
criticized for neglecting the influence of contextual issues or the proposers’ action set, for example by List 
(2007) and Oechssler (2010), our focus is on the receivers’ behavior. The purpose of the dictator game in our 
experiment is to induce different perceptions of fairness among receivers.  
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1.2 Related Literature 
In economics, cheating has been studied in the context of cheap-talk games (e.g. Sutter 
(2009); Charness and Dufwenberg (2006); Gneezy (2005)), where subjects send messages 
that can be used to deceive their counterparts. Experimental evidence on unobserved cheating 
has only recently begun to accumulate. In the experimental tournament of Freeman and 
Gelber (2010), subjects cheated by misreporting the number of correctly solved mazes. The 
misreporting varied according to monetary incentives. Bucchiol and Piovesan (2011) 
conducted an experiment in which children tossed a coin in private and reported the result, 
knowing that they would receive a reward only if they reported one of the two outcomes. 86% 
of the children reported the profitable outcome, suggesting a substantial proportion of them 
cheated. In a field study, Pruckner and Sausgruber (2011) observed that 2/3 of newspaper 
readers took advantage of an opportunity to take a newspaper without paying. Moreover, 90 
percent of those who did pay actually paid less than the full price. This sort of “incomplete 
cheating” also occurred in an experiment conducted by Fischbacher and Heusi (2008), 
wherein subjects reported the result of a private die roll to determine their payoff. Fischbacher 
and Heusi found that subjects shaded the outcome of the roll favorably, but did not take the 
maximum earnings advantage offered by the lying opportunity. Note that a possible 
explanation for incomplete cheating is an individual’s desire to preserve a favorable self-
concept (Mazar et al., 2008).  
Researchers have also become increasingly interested in the cognitive and neuronal processes 
involved in (dis)honest decision-making. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, 
Greene and Paxton (2009) showed that honest individuals do not exhibit significantly more 
activity in brain regions associated with response conflict and cognitive control when 
foregoing an opportunity for dishonest gain. They concluded that individuals who made 
honest decisions were not, for the most part, actively resisting the temptation to cheat, but 
were simply not tempted. Wang et al. (2010) used video-based eye tracking to infer the 
individual degree of level-k reasoning from a sender’s lookup pattern of payoffs for 
alternative choices presented on a screen, and showed that this information could be 
profitably exploited by receivers. 
To the best of our knowledge, the only paper to examine how perceived unfairness 
undermines honesty is Greenberg (1990), which reported a field experiment in which a 
company subjected its workers to a temporary pay-cut due to the loss of a large contract. The 
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experimental variation was the way in which the company communicated this measure across 
plants. Workers at one production site perceived the pay-cut to be unfair, while at the other 
site it was carefully explained so as not to evoke this feeling. Greenberg showed that the 
workers in the “unfair” condition responded with a substantial increase in employee theft that 
was not observed in the “fair” condition. This finding is consistent with Fehr et al. (1993) who 
showed in a laboratory experiment that the degree of co-operation of “workers” declined 
when they perceived the “employer’s” wage offers as unfair. It is also in line with the results 
of Schweizer and Gibson (2008) where subjects indicated in a questionnaire that they would 
be more likely to engage in unethical behaviors when they perceived their counterpart to 
violate fairness standards. While cheating in Greenberg’s experiment occurred at the expense 
of the party responsible for the “unfair” decision, we investigate whether the perception of 
unfair treatment erodes honesty even when there is no scope for reciprocity.   
 
1.3 Design of the Experiment 
The experiment was conducted in MELESSA, the experimental laboratory at the University 
of Munich. Participants were recruited from the lab’s subject database, which is maintained 
using software written by Greiner (2004). A total of 502 individuals participated in one of 21 
sessions.2 Most subjects were undergraduates from the University of Munich. Average 
earnings were €10.5, including a €4-show-up fee, for an average duration of around 35 
minutes. The experiment was implemented in paper and pencil format and consisted of two 
stages: a decision situation (the dictator game) and the coin flip game. Subjects were not 
aware of the second stage until the dictator game was resolved. While the dictator game took 
around 25 to 30 minutes, the coin flip stage lasted no more than 5 minutes. 
The dictator game was conducted using the strategy method. At first, subjects did not know 
whether they would be in the role of proposer or receiver. We asked them to decide how they 
would split an initial endowment of €8 between themselves and another person in the room if 
it turned out that they were in the role of the proposer. The intended transfer had to be marked 
on the decision sheet and could range from €0 to €8 in increments of €2. Subjects knew that 
after they made their decision, half of them would be randomly selected as proposers, and 
their choice would be implemented. The remaining half would be passive receivers, whose 
earnings would be determined solely by the decision of the matched proposer. A short quiz 
                                                 
2 20 sessions comprised of 24 subjects, one session of 22 subjects. 
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ensured that all subjects understood the rules of the dictator game, as well as the experimental 
procedure.  
The randomization of roles and pairs was implemented by means of 24 identical envelopes. 
Each envelope contained a tag with a code consisting of a letter (from A through L) and a 
number (either 1 or 2). Thus, a tag might read A1 or A2, B1 or B2, C1 or C2, and so on. The 
number indicated the role in the game (1 for the proposer, 2 for the receiver) and the letter 
matched each participant with another person in the room. Those with an identical letter 
formed a pair, with Player 1 as proposer and Player 2 as receiver. After the randomization 
procedure, the sheets were collected and matched with the decision sheet of the respective 
counterpart, and the associated payoffs were recorded. Then subjects were informed of their 
earnings.  
Not computerizing the experiment allowed us to provide receivers with their matched 
counterpart’s decision sheet. As a result, receivers could read directly how much the proposer 
had transferred. They could also see the proposer’s tag number, which was written on the 
sheet as well. This procedure guaranteed full anonymity while allowing receivers to verify 
that the matching procedure was performed correctly and not manipulated by the 
experimenter.  
Receivers were also given a sheet on which they had to indicate, using a four-point scale, how 
fair they considered the behavior of the other person. They could rate the matched proposer as 
“fair,” “rather fair,” “rather unfair,” or “unfair.” In deliberately excluding a neutral category, 
we sought to avoid having subjects choose this category without further reflection. Proposers 
received a confirmation that their decision was actually payoff relevant, and an additional 
blank sheet to ensure that every subject received the same number of sheets, which made it 
impossible to figure out the roles of other subjects in the lab by counting the number of 
sheets.  
After the dictator game was resolved, subjects were informed that they would get a chance to 
increase their earnings before the session closed. While the experimenter explained the rules 
of the coin flip game, an assistant provided each participant with a €1 coin. Subjects were told 
that they would have to flip the coin and that their payoff would be determined by the upper 
side of the coin. If the coin landed on heads, their payoff would be €1 (i.e., they could keep 
the coin); if the coin landed on tails, their payoff would be €3. Then subjects were instructed 
to flip the coin and to report the outcome by checking the appropriate box on the sheet. 
FAIRNESS AND CHEATING 
14 
 
Finally, the earnings from the coin flip and the dictator game were paid out and the 
experiment concluded.  
We did not want to invite people to cheat. Indeed, we never mentioned the possibility. We 
also did not remind them to be honest. Nevertheless, the environment was quite simple, and it 
likely occurred to most subjects that cheating was a riskless way to earn two additional Euros.  
It is important to emphasize that cheating was understood by the subjects to be riskless. 
Indeed, all seats in the laboratory were separated and view-protected; it was clear that 
cheating could not be detected. Furthermore, we explicitly instructed subjects to flip their coin 
in such a way that no one else could observe the outcome.  
 
1.4 Results 
1.4.1 Dictator Game and Reported Fairness Perceptions 
We begin with the dictator game. Table 1.1 shows the distribution of those transfers that were 
actually implemented after random assignment of roles (the allocation decisions of assigned 
proposers) and the hypothetical transfers of assigned receivers (recall that we used the 
strategy method). A chi-2 test confirms that both distributions are not significantly different 
(p-value = 0.942). On average, €1.90 was transferred, meaning that proposers retained about 
76% for themselves, which is within the usual range of outcomes in dictator games.3  
 
Table 1.1: Hypothetical and Actual Transfers in the Dictator Game 
 Proposers: actual transfers Receivers: hypothetical transfers 
Amount Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
0 96 38.25 122 48.61 
2 75 29.88 53 21.12 
4 77 30.68 68 27.09 
6 2 0.80 2 0.80 
8 1 0.40 6 2.39 
Total 251 100.00 251 100.00 
 
 
                                                 
3 For an overview of dictator game results see e.g. chapter 2 of Camerer (2003). 
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We use the amount transferred as an indicator of how fair the receiver was treated. Evidence 
from a large number of ultimatum games presented in Camerer (2003) demonstrates that on 
average one-third of the receivers reject offers between 20% and 30% of the endowment, 
indicating that a substantial proportion of subjects perceives such a division as unfair. 
Camerer also shows that the rejection rate of offers between 0% and 10% is usually far above 
50%, and in many experiments close or equal to 100%. We therefore interpret proposer 
decisions with a transfer below an equal split – €0 or €2 – as potentially unfair.  
Table 1.2 shows the distribution of receivers’ subjective fairness ratings. Almost 44% of 
receivers perceived that they had been treated “fairly.” The response options “rather fair”, 
“rather unfair” and “unfair” were all chosen by less than one fifth of our sample. In Table 1.3, 
we combine the responses “fair” and “rather fair” (62.55%), as well as “unfair” and “rather 
unfair” (37.45%), in a cross-tabulation with the amount received (also combined into three 
categories of about equal size). There is a statistically significant association (χ2 = 97.01, p-
value < 0.001) between the two variables; subjects who received a larger amount were more 
likely to say that they had been treated (rather) fairly. In no case was an equal split rated as 
“unfair” or “rather unfair.” 
 
Table 1.2: Subjective Perception of the Fairness of Transfers Made (Receivers) 
Perceived Fairness Frequency Percentage 
Fair 110 43.82 
Rather Fair 47 18.73 
Rather Unfair 45 17.93 
Unfair 49 19.52 
Total 251 100.00 
 
Interestingly, Table 1.3 also reveals that 28.13% of respondents regard a transfer of zero as 
(rather) fair. However, this claim was only made by respondents who would have acted 
similarly if they had been a proposer; 25 out of 27 would have transferred €0 and the 
remaining 2 persons would have transferred only €2. A possible interpretation is that their 
fairness rating reflects their desire to ex-post justify their own selfish behavior rather than 
their true opinion about the proposer’s action. 
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Table 1.3: Transfer Received and Subjective Fairness Rating (Receivers) 
Perceived Fairness Amount received Total 
0 2 ≥ 4 
(Rather) Unfair 69 
(71.88%) 
25 
(33.33%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
94 
(37.45%) 
 
(Rather) Fair 
 
 
27 
(28.13%) 
50 
(66.67%) 
80 
(100.00%) 
157 
(62.55%) 
Total 96 75 80 251 
(100.00) 
 
 
1.4.2 Reported Coin Flip Outcomes  
Next, we turn to the outcome of the coin flip. 374 of the 502 subjects (74.5%) reported the 
high-payoff outcome (tails), which is significantly different from the expected outcome of a 
fair coin (p-value < 0.001). This finding shows that cheating occurred on a broad basis. The 
proportion of tails is higher among receivers (76.49%) than among dictators (72.51%). 
Among receivers, those who earned a positive amount in the dictator game were significantly 
less likely to report tails than those receivers who earned nothing (p-value = 0.088). However, 
the proportion of tails reported is a highly conservative estimate of cheating in the population 
since the majority (asymptotically 50%) obtained this result without resorting to cheating.  
Therefore, we can go one step further and estimate the fraction of cheaters in the population 
from which our sample of subjects was drawn. The identification problem can be described by 
a simple mixture model with two types: cheaters and non-cheaters. With fair coins and a large 
sample, half of the subjects should have flipped tails, and the other half heads. The fifty 
percent of subjects who flipped tails (the high-payoff outcome) had no monetary incentive to 
lie; thus, it seems reasonable to assume that they reported the true outcome.4 However, among 
the other half who flipped heads (the low-payoff outcome), some might have lied.  
From the observed sample proportion of tails, we can estimate the implied proportion of 
cheaters in the population nonparametrically. The mixture model assumes (quite naturally) 
that the population from which the subjects were drawn consists of two types: cheaters and 
honest subjects. We can characterize the observed proportion of tails p in the population by  
                                                 
4 We cannot, in principle, exclude the possibility that some subjects reported the bad outcome despite obtaining 
the good outcome, perhaps to make certain that nobody suspected them of cheating, or because they exhibited 
altruism towards the experimenter. However, we believe it is reasonable to assume, in the context of our 
laboratory experiment, that such behavior did not occur. 
FAIRNESS AND CHEATING 
17 
 
 
  ( ) ( )1 1 0.5 0.5 1p γ γ γ= ⋅ + − ⋅ = + . 
 
A fraction γ of the members of the population cheats and reports tails with a probability of 1, 
while honest members of the population report tails only with probability 0.5. We will call 
γ the cheating rate. After solving for γ, we can use the sample analog of p (i.e., the observed 
fraction of tails) to obtain a consistent estimate of the population cheating rate γ as 2·(74.5% – 
50%) = 49%. By the same logic, cheating rates can be computed for subsamples of our 
subjects. Figure 1.1 illustrates that the proportion of tails in a (sub)population maps directly 
into the implied fraction of cheaters via a linear function. 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Relationship Between Proportion of Tails and Implied Fraction of Cheaters 
 
 
Table 1.4 contains information about the proportion of subjects who reported tails, and a 
comparison of cheating rates by experimental outcomes and demographic background 
variables. The proportion of tails is significantly different from 50% for all sub-groups. 
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Table 1.4: Comparison of Cheating Rates 
variable values N % tails implied % of cheaters 
p-value from test  
for equality of 
proportions 
All subjects  502 74.50 49.00  
Role Proposer 251 72.51 45.02  0.075* 
Receiver 251 76.49 52.98 
Earnings 
(Proposers) 
≤ 4 80 68.75 37.50 ≤4 vs. 6: 0.137 
6 vs. 8: 0.940 
≤4 vs. >4: 0.101 
6 75 74.67 49.34 
8 96 73.96 47.92 
Earnings 
(Receivers) 
0 96 82.29 64.58 0 vs. 2: 0.003*** 
2 vs. ≥4: 0.280  
0 vs. >0: 0.004*** 
2 75 70.67 41.34 
≥ 4 80 75.00 50.00 
Hypothetical 
Transfer 
(Receivers) 
0 122 78.69 57.38 0 vs. 2: 0.890 
2 vs. ≥4: 0.067* 
0 vs. >0: 0.176 
2 53 79.25 58.50 
≥ 4 76 71.05 42.10 
Fairness rating (rather) fair 157 73.25 46.50 0.008*** 
(rather) unfair 94 81.91 63.82 
Gender Male 215 80.47 60.94 < 0.001*** 
Female 287 70.03 40.06 
Lab experience 0 or 1 279 69.53 39.06 < 0.001*** 
>1 223 80.72 61.44 
Major field of 
study 
Economics 35 68.57 37.14 Econ vs. Maths:  
0.009*** 
Maths vs. other: 
0.006***  
all other pairwise 
comparisons 
insignificant 
Business 77 75.32 50.64 
Law 34 76.47 52.94 
Medicine 56 71.43 42.86 
Education 62 77.42 54.84 
Maths  62 82.26 64.52 
Other 176 72.16 44.32 
Notes: “Maths” equal 1 if major subject is mathematics, physics, or engineering.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10 
 
The implied cheating rate is higher among receivers than among proposers (53% vs. 45%). 
Interestingly, this difference is almost entirely due to the high cheating rate of those receivers 
who earned nothing (64.6%). When comparing only proposers and receivers with a positive 
payoff (at least €2), the fraction of cheaters is almost identical – even though proposers earned 
roughly twice as much as receivers with non-zero earnings (€6.12 vs. €3.08). The fact that the 
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cheating rates are similar, despite a huge earnings gap, seems to weigh against an “income-
targeting” explanation for cheating. If subjects have an individual income target in mind when 
they come to the experiment, and if those who have not yet reached their income target have a 
higher propensity to cheat, groups with different income levels should also exhibit markedly 
different cheating rates.  
The self-reported fairness rating helps to explain cheating among receivers. The cheating rate 
of those who rated their counterpart as “fair” or “rather fair” is 46.5%, compared to 64% 
among those who perceived to have been treated “unfairly” or “rather unfairly” (p-
value=0.008). 
Cheating seems to be correlated with distributional preferences in the sense that subjects who 
revealed stronger other-regarding preferences in the dictator game were more likely to be 
honest. In particular, proposers who shared half of their endowment with the receiver cheated 
significantly less than their more selfish peers (cheating rates are 37.5% vs. 48.5%). The same 
finding emerges when considering the hypothetical transfers of receivers. Those who would 
have implemented an equal split were significantly more honest than those who would have 
retained a larger share for themselves. 
We also find that men cheated more often than women (p-value < 0.001), with cheating rates 
of 60% vs. 40%. This result is in line with Dreber and Johannesson (2008) who also observed 
that men are more dishonest when they can employ a lie to their own advantage.5 Moreover, 
experienced subjects (defined as having participated in more than one previous experiment in 
the MELESSA lab) were significantly less honest than subjects who participated in no more 
than one previous experiment (61% vs. 39%). Cheating rates by subjects’ major field of 
studies are similar and we do not find significant differences, with the exception that students 
in mathematical fields tend to be slightly more dishonest. However, sample sizes become 
relatively small when testing for differences across study fields. 
  
                                                 
5 In contrast, evidence from psychology (De Paolo et al., 1996) suggests that women lie more often than men 
when the lie is intended to flatter or benefit the other person and is not linked to harmful consequences (a “white 
lie”). 
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1.5 “No Intentions” Treatment 
In this section, we present a treatment designed to disentangle motives for cheating. Unfair 
dictator behavior may not be the only reason why receivers with a low payoff perceive it as 
legitimate to seek compensation via cheating. Our design creates two types of inequality – 
hierarchical inequality (between a dictator-receiver pair) and peer inequality (among 
receivers). Hierarchical inequality is created by the intentional decision of the dictators. In 
contrast, peer inequality is the recognition by receivers that the decisions of different dictators 
are likely to induce inequality among receivers. While a receiver cannot observe the earnings 
distribution among his peers, he will likely believe that his earnings are higher than average if 
the dictator has implemented an equal split, but lower than average if the dictator has 
transferred nothing to him. Therefore, it might be argued that subjects not only cheated 
because they were treated unfairly by the dictator or fell short of their income target, but also 
because they believed that some (or most) of their peers were likely doing better. 
 
1.5.1 Experimental Design 
We investigate alternative motives for cheating by implementing a treatment that preserves 
earnings inequality across receivers but where unfair dictator intentions are absent. To do this 
while preserving the timing and procedures in the lab, we replaced the dictator game with a 
neutral task of the same length. This avoided distortion due to a correlation between the 
cheating propensity of subjects and the time spent in the lab. The task consisted of answering 
a questionnaire which was unrelated to issues about fairness or cheating.6 As with the dictator 
game, the questionnaire was completed using paper-and-pencil. After completing the 
alternative task, subjects were informed of their earnings. However, they were also informed 
that others earned either more, less or the same as they did. By implementing this earning 
inequality via a random mechanism, we captured the dictator game’s peer-inequality among 
receivers, while avoiding acts that might be viewed as particularly fair or unfair. Likewise, we 
avoided asking subjects to report their feelings regarding the fairness of the random earnings 
allocation. The reason is that doing this could have introduced an intentions confound by 
evoking perceptions of unfairness in relation to the experimenter. Finally, it is worthwhile to 
                                                 
6 The questionnaire contained various hypothetical choice questions about housing demand and mobile phone 
use, as well as the same demographic background questions elicited in the dictator game. 
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note that an attractive feature of this “no-intentions” design is that it also provides evidence on 
an income-targeting explanation for differences in cheating rates. 
We implemented these sessions in the following way. When subjects entered the lab, they 
followed the usual procedure of drawing a seat number.  Although they did not know it, this 
draw also determined their earnings for the experiment. At their seat they found a sealed 
envelope which had been prepared before the experiment and randomly placed. Subjects were 
instructed not to open the envelope until told to do so. Each envelope contained a note stating 
how much a subject would earn for participating in the experiment. After all subjects finished 
the questionnaire, they were told that they would earn either 0, 2, or 4 Euros in addition to 
their show-up payment of 4 Euros. We chose the distribution of payoffs to reflect the 
distribution of the most frequent receiver earnings in each session of the “no intentions” 
treatment.7 We then instructed subjects to open their envelope to find out how much they had 
earned and proceeded with the coin flip game just as in the “fairness” treatment. Total 
earnings consisted of the amount specified in the note plus the payoff associated with the coin 
flip. 
 
1.5.2 Results 
We ran 10 sessions of this condition with a total of 238 subjects. Results are summarized in 
Table 1.5.8 The aggregate cheating rate is 42.86%, which is slightly, and insignificantly, 
lower than the overall cheating rate in the “fairness” treatment (49.00%). It is comparable to 
the cheating rate among proposers in the “fairness” treatment, which is 45.02%, but 
significantly (p-value = 0.025) lower than the cheating rate across receivers (52.98%). This is 
consistent with our initial hypothesis that cheating is higher among subjects who feel treated 
unfairly.  
 
  
                                                 
7 We did not match earnings above the equal split in the dictator game due to the low number of observations 
with 6 or 8 Euros in the dictator game. 
8 Due to the smaller sample size in the “no intentions“ treatment, some comparisons of cheating rates, e.g., 
across study major, suffer from a low number of subjects per category. 
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Table 1.5: Comparison of Cheating Rates in the “No Intentions” Treatment 
variable values N % tails implied % of cheaters 
p-value from test  
for equality of 
proportions 
All subjects  238 71.43 42.86  
Earnings  0 92 70.65 41.30 0 vs. 2: 0.169 
2 vs. 4: 0.049 ** 
0 vs. 4: 0.485 
2 71 76.06 52.12 
4 75 68.00 36.00 
Gender Male 102 74.51 49.02 0.096 * 
Female 136 69.12 38.24 
Lab experience 0 or 1 39 71.79 43.58 0.921 
>1 199 71.36 42.72 
Major field of 
study 
Economics 26 80.77 61.54  
Business 24 75.00 50.00 
Law 18 77.78 55.56 
Medicine 10 80.00 60.00 
Education 33 63.64 27.28 
Maths etc. 21 70.00 40.00 
other 97 69.07 38.14 
Notes: “Maths etc.” equal 1 if major subject is mathematics, physics, or engineering.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
 
Unlike in the “fairness” treatment, the implied cheating rates are not monotonically related to 
amounts earned. In particular, the implied cheating rate among those with €0 earnings 
(41.30%) is lower than among those who earn €2 (52.12%), while the implied cheating rate 
among €4 earners is 36.00%. Moreover, cheating rates are statistically identical (p-value = 
0.699) between those who earned the minimum amount and those who earned more (see 
Figure 1.2). This result is evidence against both peer inequality and income-targeting as 
motives for cheating. Our data suggest, rather, that experiencing unfair treatment leaves one 
more likely to cheat on a subsequent decision. 
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Figure 1.2: Cheating Rates (Proportion Tails Reported) by Earnings in Both Treatments 
 
 
 
 
The same conclusion emerges from a regression framework. Table 1.6 reports average 
marginal effects for a probit regression where the dependent variable is 1 if a subject reports 
tails. Thus, positive marginal effects correspond to an increased likelihood of cheating.9 
Column 1 contains results for receivers in the “fairness treatment” and shows that the 
probability of reporting tails is significantly higher for those subjects who received zero in the 
dictator game vs. those who received a positive amount. Male subjects and those with more 
lab experience were also significantly more likely to report tails, while none of the dummies 
for major subject was significant.  
 
  
                                                 
9 Again, it should be kept in mind that the proportion of subjects reporting tails is a highly conservative estimate 
for actual cheating.  
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Table 1.6: Probit Regression for Reporting Tails (i.e. the Better Outcome) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 “fairness 
treatment” 
only receivers 
“no intentions” 
treatment 
“no intentions” 
treatment;  
only subjects with 
lab experience < 7  
“no intentions” 
treatment; 
weighted 
regression 
     
Received zero 0.0901 * 
(0.0535) 
 
-0.0087 
(0.0604) 
0.0184   
(0.0682)      
-0.0826      
(0.0615) 
Male 0.1371 *** 
(0.0528) 
 
0.0558 
(0.0632) 
0.1027   
(0.0691)      
0.1060 *     
(0.0591) 
Lab experience > 1 0.1120 ** 
(0.0523) 
 
-0.0061 
(0.0781) 
-0.0155  
(0.0792)     
0.0049      
(0.0580) 
Major Econ -0.1343 
(0.1211) 
 
0.1061 
(0.0881) 
0.1272   
(0.0907)      
0.1939 ***     
(0.0683) 
Major Business 0.0155 
(0.0762) 
 
0.0421 
(0.0985) 
0.0340   
(0.1090)      
-0.0313      
(0.0889) 
Major Law -0.0128 
(0.1123) 
 
0.0788 
(0.1059) 
0.1517   
(0.1063)      
-0.0654      
(0.1854) 
Major Medicine -0.0691 
(0.0998) 
 
0.1175 
(0.1219) 
0.1145   
(0.1262)      
0.1377      
(0.1293) 
Major Education 0.0663 
(0.0743) 
 
-0.0527 
(0.0933) 
-0.0094   
(0.0984)     
-0.1386      
(0.0936) 
Major  Maths -0.0279 
(0.0975) 
 
-0.0146 
(0.0981) 
-0.1751   
(0.1327)     
-0.2380 **      
(0.1112) 
Log-likelihood -130.03 -140.30 -106.53 -126.76 
# observations 251 238 184 236 
Notes: Average marginal effects reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
 
Column 2 of Table 1.6 reports the results of the same specification for the “no intentions” 
treatment. If income-targeting or peer inequality are to explain the variation in cheating rates 
across earnings, the dummy for earning the minimum amount should continue to be a 
significant predictor of reporting tails. However, column 2 shows that this is not the case; the 
marginal effect is insignificant and very close to zero. Being male is again positively 
associated with reporting tails, but not significantly so, and the strong experience effect from 
the fairness treatment vanishes completely.  
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Since the proportion of inexperienced subjects was much lower in the “no intentions” 
treatment, we wanted to ensure that differences in sample composition were not driving our 
main result. Therefore, as a robustness check, we repeated the analysis using only subjects 
who had not previously participated in more than seven experiments (the number 
corresponding to the most experienced subject in the fairness treatment (Column 3)). We 
further estimated a weighted regression where we weighted lab experience such that it 
corresponded to the distribution in the fairness treatment (Column 4). Neither of these 
robustness checks changed our result that randomly assigned earnings are uncorrelated with 
the decision to report tails in the “no intentions” treatment.   
 
1.6 Conclusion 
Substantial recent progress has been made in understanding the importance of lying and 
cheating for economic decision making (see, e.g., Gneezy (2005), Fischbacher and Heusi 
(2008), Mazar et al. (2008), Sutter (2009), Wang et al. (2010)). In this chapter we reported 
data from an experiment designed to investigate how unfair treatment in a dictator game 
affects individuals’ propensities to cheat in a subsequent task. We used two approaches to 
measure fairness in the dictator game: 1) the amount transferred; and 2) the receiver’s 
subjective fairness perception of the amount received. Our analysis shows that both measures 
significantly predict cheating. We also reported a ‘no-intentions” treatment that rules out 
natural alternative explanations for our data, including income-targeting or a desire to reduce 
inequality in relation to peers.   
Our data argue that the perception of being treated unfairly by another person significantly 
increases an individual’s propensity to cheat. One way to interpret our findings is that 
individuals might be more likely to violate a social norm (the no-stealing norm) when they 
perceive that others do not adhere to a different, unrelated norm (the fairness norm). This 
interpretation is consistent with Keizer et al. (2009) who documented such a “cross-norm 
inhibition effect” in a series of field experiments. They showed that an envelope hanging out 
of a mailbox with a €5 note attached was stolen twice as often when the area around the 
mailbox was covered with graffiti than when the area was clean. Remarkably, general 
disorder seems to induce a violation of the no-stealing norm, which is not only widely 
accepted but even legally protected. This is an extension of the well-known Broken Window 
Theory of Wilson and Kelling (1982), which suggests that when individuals observe frequent 
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violations of a social norm, the probability that they themselves conform to this norm 
declines. 
The causal link between fairness and cheating suggested in this chapter is important for 
understanding decisions such as whether to evade taxes. A tax system may be perceived as 
unjust if tax rates are excessively high or if it contains loopholes which allow certain 
segments of the population to substantially reduce their tax burden. An experimental study by 
Spicer and Becker (1980) showed that in a situation that was specifically framed in a taxation 
context, subjects indeed tried to evade taxes more often when they were exposed to higher 
than average tax rates. A related experiment by Heinemann and Kocher (2010) shows that a 
change in the tax regime (in their case from a proportionate to a progressive tax, or vice versa) 
leads to an increase in tax evasion of reform losers whose taxes have increased. In contrast, 
Kleven et al. (2011) conclude from a large field experiment that marginal tax rates have only 
a modest effect on tax evasion. However, a high individual tax rate is only one aspect of how 
fair a tax system is might be considered. Our study suggests that the connection between 
fairness and tax evasion might have important implications for public policy and merits 
further research. Also, in an experiment framed in the related context of emissions trading, 
Cason and Raymond (2011) find that an equitable allocation of emission permits leads to 
more honest reporting behavior.   
Methodologically, our experimental design creates an environment that allows us to study 
how interaction with others affects an individual’s propensity to cheat. The limitation, 
however, is that individual cheating cannot be observed. Thus, inferences must be based on 
aggregate statistics that characterize differences between observed and predicted distributions 
of self-reported outcomes of a random event. This approach requires large sample sizes to 
find significant effects. Nevertheless, we did find significant effects, namely that subjects who 
perceive they have been treated unfairly by their respective dictators cheat more often in a 
subsequent coin flip game.   
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Appendix: Instructions 
The Experiment 
In this experiment there will be two roles, which will be referred to as Person 1 and Person 2, 
respectively. You will be randomly assigned to one of these roles. In the course of the 
experiment you will be randomly and anonymously matched with another participant, who 
will be in the opposite role. As mentioned above, you will not receive any information about 
the other participant’s identity.   
 
Procedure 
At the beginning, Person 1 receives an initial endowment of $8. Then Person 1 has to divide 
the $8 between himself and Person 2.  
The payoff to Person 1 is €8 minus the amount sent to Person 2.  
The payoff to Person 2 is the amount that Person 1 has sent.  
When deciding about how much to send, Person 1 can choose one of the following options: 
- Send €0 to Person 2 and keep €8; or 
- Send €2 Euros to Person 2 and keep €6; or 
- Send €4 to Person 2 and keep €4; or 
- Send €6 to Person 2 and keep €2; or 
- Send €8 to Person 2 and keep €0. 
 
We will ask you to indicate your preferred option before you know if you actually are 
Person 1.  
Whether you will be Person 1 or Person 2 will be determined randomly. Therefore you will 
have to pick an envelope later. Inside there will be a tag with a combination of a letter and a 
number (either 1 or 2). So at tag might read A1 or A2, B1 or B2, C1 or C2, and so on. The 
number indicates whether you will be Person 1 or Person 2. The letter matches you with 
another participant in the opposite role. For example, the person who gets A1 is matched with 
the person who gets A2.   
So, if you have a “1” you will be Person 1. Your earnings will correspond to the option which 
you chose. If you have a “2” you will be Person 2. Then your earnings will be the amount sent 
by your matched Person 1.  
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Quiz 
This short quiz ensures that you understand the features of the experiment. You cannot earn 
anything in the test, but it might help you to make a good decision afterwards.  
 
 
Question 1: 
Imagine you have chosen to send €4 to Person 2 in case that it turns out that you are 
Person 1, and to keep €4 for yourself.  
Then you pick an envelope which contains the tag X2. This means that your role is Person 2.  
Your matched counterpart (i.e. the person with the tag X1) has indicated that he would keep 
€6 and send only €2. 
 
a) How much do you earn in this case? ___ 
 
b) How much does your matched counterpart in the role of Player 1 earn? ___ 
 
 
 
Question 2: 
Now imagine that you have chosen to keep €8 and send nothing to Person 2. Then you pick an 
envelope with the tag X1. This means that your role is Person 1.  
 
a) How much do you earn in this case? ___ 
 
b) How much does your matched counterpart in the role of Player 2 earn? ___ 
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Your Choice 
So far you do not know if you are Person 1 or Person 2. Now you have to decide what you 
will do if it turns out you will be Player 1. 
 
 
Please decide now how much you want to give to Person 2 by ticking the appropriate box.  
 
 
IMPORTANT: Think carefully about your decision! Once you ticked the box, you 
cannot change it any more. 
 
 
 
How much of the €8 would you send to Person 2? 
 
€0 
 
  
€2 
 
  
€4 
 
  
€6 
 
  
€8 
 
  
  
 
 
We will continue after all subjects have made their decisions. Please wait quietly. 
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Questionnaire 
 
Please answer the following questions about yourself. Your anonymity remains guaranteed.  
 
1) Are you Male or Female 
o Male            
o Female 
 
2) What is your major?  
 
          __________________________________________________ 
 
3) What is your age?  
 
      __________________________________ 
 
4) In how many MELESSA experiments did you participate so far? If you are not sure 
please give an approximate number.  
 
______ 
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Only dictators: 
 
You have been randomly assigned to the role of Person 1.  
 
Your payoff is €8 minus the amount that you decided to send to Person 2.  
 
Please wait for a moment until you receive further instructions.  
 
 
 
 
Only receivers: 
 
You have been randomly assigned to the role of Person 2.  
 
You received a sheet with the choice of the person who has been matched with you. On this 
sheet you can see how much Person 1 has sent to you. This is your payoff from this 
experiment, which we will pay out to you later.  
 
 
Now we would like to know your opinion about the fairness of Person 1. How would you rate 
the behavior of Person 1?  
 
Fair   
Rather Fair   
Rather Unfair   
Unfair   
 
 
Please wait for a moment until you receive further instructions.  
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All subjects: 
 
Now you have the chance to increase your earnings.  
You will get a €1 coin from us. We will ask you to flip the coin and to report the result below. 
Depending on how lucky you are you can earn the following:  
 
If you flip heads on the upper side, you have earned €1. In this case you keep the €1 coin. 
If you flip tails on the upper side, you have earned €3. In this case you keep the €1 coin and 
you will receive a further €2 at the end. 
 
Now please flip the coin.  
Flip the coin at your seat and make sure that the coin doesn’t fall to the ground and that 
none of the other participants can see the result of the coin flip! 
 
 
Please mark what was on the upper side of the coin: 
o Heads 
o Tails 
 
 
 
Thank you for your participation! 
For the payment we will now call you person by person. Please take all sheets with you. 
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2 Lying and Responsibility 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
An average person tells between a handful and several dozens of lies per days, depending on 
which psychological study we are willing to believe and whether a bold exaggeration already 
qualifies as a lie. For example, in an experiment by Feldman et al. (2002) over 60% of 
subjects admitted to have lied at least once during a 10 minute conversation, and the number 
of lies told ranged from 1 to 12. While the investigation of dishonest behavior has for long 
been a rather neglected field in economics, it has recently moved to the focus of several 
theoretical as well as experimental studies, e.g. Fischbacher and Heusi (2008), Kartig (2009), 
Lundquist et al. (2009), Sánchez-Pagés and Vorsatz (2007), or Serra-Garcia et al. (2011). 
Dishonest behavior can be observed in a variety of situations with primary interest to 
economists. Examples are incorrectly filled tax report, claiming qualifications in a job 
interview which one does not actually possess, hiding negative aspects when selling a product 
or service, and many more. Of course, a lie need not be believed by the other party. The tax 
administration’s central purpose is to make sure that a sufficiently large proportion of lies are 
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detected. A job applicant’s bold assertions about the number of fluently spoken languages or 
an impressive educational background are likely to be questioned and tested in an interview. 
And when making a non-trivial purchase, many customers look for independent information 
to confirm the promises made by the sales agent. 
Lying is far from being a rarely occurring event although it violates an important social norm 
and hardly anyone would readily admit to be a dishonest and untrustworthy person. Akerlof 
(1983) and Hao and Houser (2011) argue that individuals have a preference if not for being 
honest then at least for appearing to be honest, and Mazar et al. (2008) show that this is true 
not only vis-à-vis others but also vis-à-vis oneself. In their experiment people cheated 
significantly more often in situations which provided them with a justification for their 
behavior, thus allowing them to maintain a favorable self-concept.  
Given that lying to the disadvantage of others is morally costly, an interesting question is 
whether alleviating or diluting the responsibility for the negative outcome of another person 
reduces the threshold for telling a lie, thereby making lying more frequent. Studying this 
research question in the laboratory allows us to have full control over the probability with 
which lies are transmitted. For the dictator game, Dana et al. (2007) show that subjects indeed 
behave significantly less pro-social when responsibility is diluted. In this context, lying is of 
particular interest as it is arguably a much stronger violation of social norms than refusing to 
share in the dictator game. 
The control treatment of our experiment uses the sender-receiver game introduced by Gneezy 
(2005) and subsequently modified by e.g. Dreber and Johannesson (2008), Hurkens and 
Kartig (2009) and Sutter (2009), where a sender can lie to a receiver in order to increase her 
own payoff at the expense of the other person. We augment the sender-receiver design with a 
responsibility treatment in which we introduce uncertainty about whether the message from 
the sender will actually be forwarded to a receiver or not. We fix the probability that lies are 
transmitted to exactly 50% and investigate whether reducing the possibility of harming others 
with a lie affects a sender’s inclination to be dishonest. 
Our research question is also related to the experimental literature on decision-making with 
responsibility for others. In a trust game setting, Song (2008) finds that subjects both trust less 
and reciprocate less when they act as group-representatives with responsibility for the other 
group members’ outcomes than when their decisions only have consequences for themselves. 
In contrast, Charness and Jackson (2009) show that responsibility for others induces subjects 
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to play a less risky strategy in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, which might be interpreted as more 
pro-social behavior. With binary lotteries involving gains or losses Pahlke et al. (2010) show 
that responsibility for others increases both risk aversion in the gain domain and risk seeking 
in the loss domain.  
This chapter is structured in the following way: Section 2.2 explains the design of the 
experiment, section 2.3 reports the results for senders and receivers, and section 2.4 concludes 
with a brief discussion. 
 
2.2 Experimental Design 
This experiment employs a sender-receiver communication game with cheap talk messages 
and consists of two treatments: (i) a control treatment which replicates the original design of 
Gneezy (2005) with sender-receiver pairs and (ii) a responsibility treatment where two 
senders simultaneously send a message, but only one of the messages is actually forwarded to 
the receiver. 
 
2.2.1 A Cheap Talk Sender-Receiver Game  
In the control treatment, the sender has private information about payoffs and sends a cheap-
talk message to the receiver, who takes an action which determines the payoffs for both 
players. Specifically, the sender can choose between the following two messages: 
 Message A: “Option A will earn you more money than option B.”  
 Message B: “Option B will earn you more money than option A.” 
While the sender knows the payoffs associated with both options, the receiver has no 
information except for the sender’s message. Thus, the sender can either lie or tell the truth, 
and the receiver may or may not believe the message. Note that in a cheap-talk equilibrium a 
costless message should not convey relevant information (Crawfold and Sobel, 1982). After 
receiving an envelope with the sender’s message, the receiver decides whether to implement 
the “recommended” option or whether to choose the alternative option instead. The earnings 
in our experiment are (€8, €6) and (€6, €8), i.e. the payoff of both players are perfectly 
negatively correlated and with each option one person earns 6 Euros while the other person 
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earns 8 Euros. In this way, the monetary incentive to lie is slightly larger than in the low-
incentive treatment of Gneezy (2005) or Sutter (2009), where the difference was only $1 or 
€1, but clearly smaller than in their high-incentive treatment, where the difference was $10 or 
€10. Which of the two options would be more favorable for the sender was randomly 
determined before each session. 
Gneezy’s main result is that people are averse to lying, and that this aversion (i) decreases 
with the potential benefit from lying and (ii) increases with the harm a lie inflicts on others. 
However, as Sutter (2009) points out, only looking at the proportion of senders who forward a 
deceptive message does not capture all aspects of deception. By eliciting the senders’ 
expectations about the receivers’ behavior, he shows that some senders tell the truth because 
they don’t expect the receivers to believe them. While these “sophisticated truth-tellers” 
appear honest at first sight, they clearly act with the intention to deceive their counterpart. We 
thus follow Sutter (2009) and elicit the sender’s expectations about (i) whether the receiver 
will follow the recommended option (Q1) and (ii) what is the proportion of receivers who 
follow the sender’s message (Q2). In this way are able to investigate the effect of 
responsibility alleviation on dishonesty using both the more narrow definition of Gneezy, as 
well as Sutter’s more comprehensive measure. Both questions were incentivized and each 
correct answer was rewarded with one additional Euro. We classify subjects according to 
Table 2.1, where we interpret the behavior of “liars” and “sophisticated truth-tellers” as 
deception.  
 
Table 2.1: Classification of Senders 
 
Sender’s message 
Q1: Sender expects that receiver believes message 
YES NO 
LIE Liar benevolent liar 
TRUTH benevolent truth-teller sophisticated truth-teller 
 
 
The experiment took place in MELESSA at the University of Munich.10 It was conducted in 
paper-and-pencil format to keep the procedure as transparent as possible, which was 
especially important for the responsibility treatment. We ran 6 sessions of the control 
treatment with 16 subjects each – 8 senders and 8 receivers – which lasted approximately 20 
                                                 
10 Subjects were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). 
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minutes. Roles were randomly allocated and subjects were seated view-protected and 
separated by roles. The senders picked an envelope out of a set of otherwise identical 
envelopes which were all marked with a different letter and contained the decision sheet on 
which they indicated which message they wanted to send. The receivers also had been 
randomly assigned to a letter and received the corresponding envelope with the message. In 
this way, anonymity between receivers and senders as well as within roles was guaranteed 
during the entire experiment. Upon receipt of their envelope the receivers selected their 
preferred option, the experimenter collected the decision-sheets and recorded the payoffs. The 
experiment concluded with a brief socio-demographic questionnaire which for the senders 
also included the incentivized questions Q1 and Q2. 
 
2.2.2 Responsibility Treatment  
In the control treatment each message from a sender had one designated recipient. In contrast, 
the responsibility treatment was designed such that the probability that a sender’s message 
reaches a receiver is exactly 50%. For this purpose there are two senders for each receiver. 
Again the senders decide which message to send and put the decision-sheet in their envelope. 
However, with two senders for each receiver there are also two envelopes with the same 
letter. As the senders are seated in two rows, the envelopes are collected separately for each 
row and a randomly chosen receiver picks one set of envelopes which is distributed to the 
receivers. The other set is withdrawn from the experiment. In this way, neither side knows 
whose envelopes have actually been chosen. Then again each receiver opts for either option A 
or B, which determines her own payoff and the payoffs of both senders with the same letter. 
All subjects had been informed in detail about this procedure at the beginning of the 
experiment, to make sure that they understood that a sender’s message is forwarded with 
exactly 50% probability.  
The asymmetric number of senders and receivers introduces the complication that a receiver 
with a very strong preference for maximizing total efficiency might prefer the option with 
lower earnings for herself, because this means that two senders receive the higher payment. 
To eliminate efficiency concerns we matched each receiver with a passive receiver who made 
no choice but earned the same as his active counterpart. In this way, there were 2 persons on 
each side of the sender-receiver game, and the total payoff was identical for each possible 
outcome. The passive receivers were guided into a separate room at the beginning of the 
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session, answered a questionnaire unrelated to the experiment, and were paid according to the 
decision of their matched active receiver. We conducted 3 sessions of this treatment, with 46 
senders and correspondingly 23 active receivers and 23 passive receivers.11 For our treatment 
comparison we thus end up with approximately the same sample size as Gneezy (2005) who 
had 50 subjects in each treatment.  
 
2.3 Results 
In the control treatment 44% of the senders (21 out of 48) forwarded the untruthful message. 
As the benefit of successfully deceiving one’s counterpart was 2 Euros, this proportion of liars 
is plausible in the light of other studies which used treatments with high and low deception 
benefits. For example, lying rates in treatments with symmetric payoffs and a gain from lying 
of 1 Euro/Dollar were 36% (Gneezy) and 44% (Sutter). In treatments with a substantially 
larger gain from lying (10 Euros/Dollars) the proportion of liars was higher than in our 
treatment, namely 52% (Gneezy) and 59% (Sutter). Thus, our control treatment produced a 
plausible deception level.  
Table 2.2 provides an overview of the results. Our main hypothesis was that the alleviation of 
responsibility leads to an increase in dishonest behavior. However, this does not seem to be 
the case. The proportion of liars is 44% in the control treatment and 48% in the responsibility 
treatment (see row [5]). While this difference is in the expected direction, it is clearly not 
significant (p-value from a two-sample test of proportions = 0.692). The same conclusion 
emerges when instead of lying per se we consider acts with dishonest intentions, i.e. senders 
who either qualify as liars or as sophisticated truth-tellers. The fraction of dishonest senders is 
48% in the control treatment vs. 52% in the responsibility treatment (see row [6]). Again, this 
result goes in the expected direction but the difference is small and again insignificant (p-
value = 0.690). 
Our data allow us to test whether we find a similar gender effect as Dreber and Johannesson 
(2008), i.e. a higher propensity to lie among male subjects. As there is no treatment effect, we 
pool the data and have 36 male and 58 female senders. While we find a difference in the same 
direction (men: 53%; women: 41%), it is smaller and insignificant (p-value = 0.256).12  
                                                 
11 We have two senders less in this treatment due to non-show-up in one session.  
12 We also estimate a linear regressions and a probit model and come to the same conclusion.  
LYING AND RESPONSIBILITY 
39 
 
Table 2.2: Experimental Results (Frequencies) 
 Control 
N=48 
Responsibility 
N=46 
Sender lies 0.44 0.48 
Q1: sender expects the receiver to implement message 0.63 0.78 
Q2: expected proportion of receivers who implement message  0.66 0.66 
Receiver beliefs the sender’s message 0.79 0.87 
   
Classification of senders   
[1] Liar 0.27 0.39 
[2] Benevolent liar 0.17 0.09 
[3] Benevolent truth-teller 0.35 0.39 
[4] Sophisticated truth-teller 0.21 0.13 
[5] Liars [1] + [2] 0.44 0.48 
[6] Dishonest subjects [1] + [4] 0.48 0.52 
 
Although theoretically a costless message from the sender should not be informative, the vast 
majority of receivers in previous experiments actually believed the sender’s message.13 This 
was not different in our sessions where 79% in the control treatment and 87% in the 
responsibility treatment followed the sender’s message. Not only is this difference 
insignificant, but it is also surprising that receivers were even more trusting in the 
responsibility treatment. If receivers had shared our prior, they would have anticipated a 
decrease in honesty due to the alleviation of responsibility and consequently find their 
counterparts rather less trustworthy.   
 
2.4 Conclusion 
In our experiment, senders had the possibility to lie to a receiver and hide behind a veil of 
ignorance as it was unclear whether their own dishonest behavior inflicted harm on a receiver. 
Perhaps surprisingly, we find no significant difference in the fraction of dishonest senders 
compared to a situation in which there is no uncertainty about whether a sender’s lie is 
                                                 
13 For comparison, the fraction of receivers who believed the sender‘s message was 78% in Gneezy (2005), 76% 
in Dreber and Johannesson (2008), 66% in Hurkens and Kartig (2009), and between 67% and 75% in the three 
treatments of Sutter (2009). 
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transmitted. This contrasts with the result of Dana et al. (2007) that anti-social behavior 
increases in a dictator game when the responsibility for the outcome is obscured. However, 
lying violates a much stronger social norm than not sharing in a dictator game. As shown by 
Gneezy (2005), the initial threshold for telling a lie is significantly higher than the threshold 
for choosing an unfair distribution in a dictator game. Furthermore, if people are averse to 
lying per se instead of the consequences of their lies, obscuring the causality between one’s 
dishonesty and someone else’s negative outcome does not make lying more acceptable. This 
is in line with the interpretation of Hurkens and Kartig (2009) that a person either never lies, 
or lies as soon as she finds the outcome obtained by lying preferable. The latter does not vary 
with the degree of responsibility, which might explain why there is no responsibility 
alleviation effect in our experiment. Thus, our findings lend additional support to the 
hypothesis that the evaluation of lying is action-based rather than outcome-based. 
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Appendix: Instructions 
A1: Instructions for Senders 
There are two roles in this experiment, which we will refer to as Person 1 and Person 2. By 
drawing your seat number you have been randomly assigned to one role. You are in the role 
of Person 1. 
 
Information and Payoffs 
How much Person 1 and Person 2 earn in this experiment is determined with the decision of 
Person 2. There are two possible payoff options, Option A and Option B, which lead to 
different earnings for Person 1 and Person 2.  
Person 1 is informed about all payoffs for each option and sends a message to Person 2.  
Person 2 has no information about possible payoffs and decides which option will be paid.  
Information only for you (=Person 1): 
 1. The options are the following: 
  Option A: 6€ for you (=Person 1) and 8€ for Person 2 
  Option B: 8€ for you (=Person 1) and 6€ for Person 2 
2. In earlier experiments of this type 78% of subjects in the role of Person 2 have 
followed the recommendation by Person 1. 
 
Your Choice: 
The only information Person 2 receives comes from you. You will have to send a message to 
Person 2 and recommend her/him one option. For this purpose you will receive an envelope 
with a decision sheet on which you can mark either: 
“Option A will earn you more money than Option B” or  
“Option B will earn you more money than Option A”. 
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Then you can put back the decision sheet in the envelope. The envelope is randomly assigned 
to you and marked with a letter from A-H. Each Person 2 also draws a letter from A-H and 
receives the corresponding envelope. 
 
[Only Responsibility Treatment] 
In this experiment there are exactly twice as many people in the role of Person 1 than 
Person 2. Therefore, there are two envelopes with the same letter. 
After you made your choice, one of the two envelopes with the same letter is randomly chosen 
to be forwarded to Person 2. The other envelopes are withdrawn from the experiment. Thus, 
the probability that Person 2 receives your envelope is exactly 50%. Neither you nor any 
other person in the room will be informed about whether your envelope has been forwarded 
or withdrawn. 
Payoffs: 
The payoffs are determined with the decision of Person 2. Always two persons earn the same: 
- Both participants in the role of Person 1 with the same letter earn the same. 
- The decision of Person 2 also determines the payoff for one of the participants who 
take part in a different experiment in the other room. This participant earns the same 
as Person 2. 
Person 2 receives the message and chooses one option. Afterwards the experiment is over and 
you receive your earnings. Your anonymity remains guaranteed. In particular, Person 2 will 
neither be informed about how much you have earned nor about the possible payoffs in the 
other option.  
 
[Incentivized questions in the questionnaire] 
Q1:  Do you expect the receiver to follow your message?  □ Yes  □ No 
Q2:  How many out of the 8 participants in the role of Person 2 do you think follow the 
message of Person 1?  
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A2: Instructions for Receivers 
There are two roles in this experiment, which we will refer to as Person 1 and Person 2. By 
drawing your seat number you have been randomly assigned to one role. You are in the role 
of Person 2. 
Information and Payoffs 
How much Person 1 and Person 2 earn in this experiment is determined with the decision of 
Person 2. There are two possible payoff options, Option A and Option B, which lead to 
different earnings for Person 1 and Person 2.  
Person 1 is informed about the corresponding payoffs and sends a message to Person 2.  
Person 2 has no information about possible payoffs and will decide which option will be paid.  
 
The message from Person 1 is either 
“Option A will earn you more money than Option B” or  
“Option B will earn you more money than Option A”. 
 
Person 1 will put the message in an envelope which is marked with a letter from A-H. Each 
Person 2 also draws a letter from A-H and receives the corresponding envelope. 
 
[Only Responsibility Treatment] 
In this experiment there are exactly twice as many people in the role of Person 1 than 
Person 2. Therefore, there are two envelopes with the same letter. 
 
After Person 1 made her choice, one of the two envelopes with the same letter is randomly 
chosen to be forwarded to you (=Person 2). The other envelopes are withdrawn from the 
experiment. Thus, the probability that an envelope from Person 1 is forwarded is exactly 50%. 
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Neither you nor any other person in the room will be informed about whose envelope you 
received. 
Payoffs: 
After receiving the message you have to make a decision. Always two persons earn the same: 
- Both participants in the role of Person 1 with the same letter earn the same. 
- Your decision also determines the payoff for one of the participants who take part in a 
different experiment in the other room. This participant earns the same as you 
(=Person 2). 
 
After receiving the message from Person 1 you have to make a decision. You will not be 
informed how much Person 1 earned, or how much you and Person 1 would have earned with 
the other option. Afterwards the experiment is over and you will receive your earnings. Your 
anonymity remains guaranteed.  
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3 Delegation and Rewards 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
Corruption is a pervasive feature across all political systems. Politicians or public officials 
have to make decisions that potentially favor one party at the expense of another. For 
example, a politician may have to vote either for a consumer-friendly or an industry-friendly 
legislation, and a public official may have to decide which of two competing firms is 
successful in the bid for a public contract. Bribing a decision-maker can be an effective way 
not to end up as the losing party, but has one obvious disadvantage – it is illegal. Whether this 
is sufficiently deterrent for the involved parties depends on the risk of being caught and the 
resulting penalties for bribery, and varies over countries and political systems. In Western 
democracies with strong rule of law, at least, bribery carries the constant threats of revelation 
by free media, prosecution by independent courts, and a negative backlash from voters and 
consumers for both the briber and the bribee. Instead, many industrialized countries have 
institutionalized lobbying as a legal and regulated form of gaining influence in exchange for 
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e.g. campaign contributions. However, contributions are usually capped at rather low levels 
compared to the rents that are at stake for the lobbying parties.14 
Our research question is whether there are more subtle but similarly effective ways of gaining 
an unfair advantage. In particular, we wonder whether a mutually beneficial relationship can 
also be maintained by an implicit agreement to exchange favors at two distinct points in time. 
This question is motivated by the fact that there are few outright corruption cases of high-
ranking public officials in Western democracies, while after their political career they 
frequently enter business relationships with parties who might have benefitted from their 
previous decisions. Given that each party has an existential interest to conceal corruption (or 
activities closely bordering on corruption), appropriate field data are not available. Thus, our 
objective is to explore this research question experimentally.  
In Western democracies there is a notable discrepancy between the monetary rewards of 
pursuing a political career during the years in office on the one hand, and the financial 
possibilities that can be exploited when a politician leaves office. A potential briber who 
refrains from bribing and instead establishes a relationship based on mutual gift-giving has 
various opportunities to reward a decision-maker after his political or administrative career, 
e.g. via honorariums for speeches or mandates, or by directly offering a position in the upper 
management level. A politician may anticipate this and proactively help the party which is 
more likely to reward him in the future. Of course, there are also legitimate reasons why a 
firm may seek the experience of a person who had an important role in the public service, 
such as personal contacts and expert knowledge. However, the line between both motives is 
thin and often blurred. Conducting an experiment offers us the possibility to create an 
environment where we can eliminate all plausibly legitimate reasons for such a business 
relationship and focus entirely on whether such a long-term co-operation can be established as 
a result of the decision-maker being “helpful” in the preceding step.  
In our experiment, we first create a situation in which a decision-maker has to allocate points 
between two other participants, while his own payoff is unaffected. This reflects that - in the 
absence of illegal payments - a politician’s income is fixed and not related to the decisions he 
takes. In the second stage, we introduce the possibility that other players reward the decision-
maker for his choice. Knowing this, the decision-maker gets the option to delegate his 
decision right, such that one self-interested player can impose her preferred allocation. A 
                                                 
14 See Harstad and Svensson (2011) for a model which can explain why bribery is relatively more common in 
poor countries, whereas lobbying is relatively more common in richer countries.   
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decision-maker may expect that doing another party a favor by delegating his decision right 
increases his reward. However, this is not contractible and entirely depends on the reciprocal 
inclinations of the party to whom the decision was delegated. It is thus uncertain whether such 
an arrangement of mutual favor trading can be similarly effective as corruption.15 
We find that even the pure anticipation of a future reward from a lobbying party suffices to 
bias a decision-maker in favor of this party, even though it creates negative externalities to 
others. The favored party frequently reciprocates and voluntarily compensates the decision-
maker for his partisan choice. In this way, they both end up with a higher payoff, but 
aggregate welfare is lower than without a rewards channel. Thus, we find that the outcome 
mirrors one that could have been achieved via a conventional bribery relationship. 
The chapter proceeds as follows: in section 3.2 we provide a brief and selective survey of 
economic research on corruption, with a focus on experiments. Section 3.3 explains the 
experimental design and section 3.4 makes behavioral predictions. Section 3.5 presents the 
results and section 3.6 concludes. 
 
3.2 Literature on Corruption and Gift-Giving 
By its very nature as an illegal activity, obtaining objective data on corruption at the 
individual level is virtually impossible when both the briber and the receiver of the bribe are 
reaping benefits from it. Furthermore, the observed occurrence of bribing is not a particularly 
informative indicator for corruption as it confounds the occurrence of bribing with the 
authorities’ determination to crack down on corruption. A different scenario is when a person 
or firm is required to pay bribes to an official in order to receive a treatment it is actually 
entitled to. A prerequisite for this situation is that the rule of law is sufficiently weak for an 
official or politician to demand a bribe without being charged, and therefore we are more 
likely to encounter cases in developing countries. Svensson (2003) uses data on involuntary 
bribe payments reported by Ugandan firms and concludes that a firm’s “ability to pay” and 
“refusal power” explain a large part of variation in bribes. A different line of research uses 
information on perceived corruption from business risk surveys and investigates its 
                                                 
15 Note that the difference between the two is not only that the order of moves is reversed (the briber first pays 
the reward, then the politician takes the decision) but also that the course of action is more consequentially in the 
case of bribery. Once a politician accepts a bribe, he already commits an illegal act. In contrast, a politician who 
implements the desired choice of a self-interested party can always claim that he found this option preferable 
himself.  
DELEGATION AND REWARDS 
48 
 
determinants in a cross-country comparison. Treisman (2000), for example, comes to the 
interesting conclusion that while a long exposure to democracy predicts lower perceived 
corruption for the countries in his sample, the current state of democracy does not.  
In the situations described above, data for bribes are available because if they are paid 
involuntarily the entity which is forced to bribe may not have a need to conceal it. Our focus, 
however, is on situations in which a bribe is paid voluntarily with the objective of gaining an 
unfair advantage. In this case, both sides commit an unethical and punishable act, and we 
should not expect that any of the two will admit this when asked in the context of a survey. 
Laboratory experiments offer the possibility of developing a better understanding of the 
underlying mechanisms when the relevant actors have no incentives for disclosure. 
The experiment designed by Abbink et al. (2002) represents essential features of corruption, 
such as a reciprocal relationship between bribers and public officials, negative welfare effects, 
and penalties in case of detection. They show how scope for reciprocity can establish a 
bribery relationship and that negative externalities had no moderating effect, while 
introducing a penalty threat did prove effective in reducing corruption. Using the same design, 
Abbink and Henning-Schmidt (2006) investigate whether the framing of the game in 
corruption terms as opposed to neutrally framed instructions had an effect on the behavior of 
subjects, but found no treatment difference. In contrast, Barr and Serra (2009) find that 
subjects were significantly less likely to offer bribes when a corruption frame was applied. 
Interestingly, Lambsdorff and Frank (2010) show that when bribers can choose whether to 
call it a “bribe” or a “gift”, around 20% of the subjects preferred the term “bribe” despite its 
morally negative connotation. Potters and Van Winden (2000) compare the behavior of 
students with professional lobbyists and find that the latter behave more in line with game 
theoretic predictions and earn more money. Büchner et al. (2008) conduct an experiment to 
study bidding behavior in public procurement auctions and show that bribes are actively and 
frequently used although they were framed in negative terms. Finally, Abbink (2004) reports 
that a change in the matching protocol from partners to strangers significantly reduces 
corruption activity, suggesting that a staff rotation policy might be a partial remedy. 
Another related paper is the gift-giving experiment of Malmendier and Schmidt (2011). Their 
study is motivated by the excessive gift-giving practice of lobbyists in sectors such as the 
pharmaceutical industry, which is unconditional but clearly driven by the expectation of 
influencing the target group (i.e. medical doctors and other health care professionals). In their 
experimental setup a decision-maker acts on behalf of a principal and has to buy a product 
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from one of two producers. One of the producers is randomly selected and receives the option 
to pass on a small gift to the decision-maker. Malmendier and Schmidt show that decision-
makers are significantly more likely to choose the product of the very producer who made the 
gift, even when the other product has a higher expected payoff and even though most 
decision-makers fully understand that the sole purpose of the gift was to influence them. This 
is an interesting result because it shows that a producer doesn’t have to go the illegal route of 
paying a bribe in order to gain an unfair advantage. Instead, it is possible to obtain a similar 
outcome by giving a seemingly unsuspicious gift. In our experiment we use a different design 
but follow a similar idea. By changing the order of moves we go one logical step further to 
see whether even the pure anticipation of a gift may result in favorable decisions for the 
potential gift giver and lead to outcomes that otherwise might have been achieved via bribing. 
Finally, the analysis in this chapter is related to the experimental literature concerned with the 
strategic motives and benefits of delegating tasks or decisions, beginning with Fershtman and 
Gneezy (2001). This line of research has shown that by delegating a decision to an agent, a 
principal can also shift the responsibility for the outcome to the agent (see e.g. Bartling and 
Fischbacher, 2011, or Coffman, 2011). Hamman et al. (2010) show that a principal who is 
reluctant to take a self-serving action may use an agent to achieve an outcome which is less 
pro-social than if he had taken the decision himself. However, delegation can also help to 
increase efficiency. Hamman et al. (2011) find that the contributions in a public goods game 
are higher when the decision is delegated to an elected agent, and Charness et al. 
(forthcoming) show that workers who can choose their wages themselves have significantly 
higher effort levels. In the latter case, delegation might pay off because both sides can 
increase their earnings if workers reciprocate. This rationale for delegation is what we are 
interested in also in our context. Delegating a decision right to a lobbying party may be 
beneficial for both if the lobbying party is reciprocally inclined. 
 
3.3 Experimental Design 
We use a novel design to investigate whether the possibility of being rewarded in the future 
induces an otherwise neutral decision-maker to favor a more powerful lobbying party at the 
disadvantage of another. In the main part of our experiment, subjects interact in groups of 3, 
with each group member in a different role. Player 1 is a decision-maker who is not directly 
affected by the decisions he takes, and can be seen as representing a public official or 
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politician. Player 2 and Player 3 are directly affected by the decision of Player 1, but their 
interests are diametrically opposed. This reflects e.g. the conflicting interests between 
producers and consumers in the face of legislative changes. In the experimental design we 
incorporate that some pressure groups are more influential, have easier access to politicians 
via lobbyists and thus an advantage in exerting direct influence compared to other groups. In 
our design, we model this by giving the decision-maker the opportunity to implement the 
outcome preferred by Player 2, but not the preferred outcome of Player 3.  
The experiment consists of two distinct parts and is briefly summarized in Table 3.1. In the 
first (“preference elicitation”) stage we elicit subjects’ preferences for earnings distributions 
conditional on their role in the game. With the instructions for the first part subjects are 
informed that there will be a second stage afterwards in which their payoffs are to be decided 
based on decisions from the first stage, but they do not receive more information about it. In 
the second (“gift-giving”) stage, the decision-maker has to decide whether he ex-post 
delegates his decision right to the more powerful lobbying party, i.e. Player 2. Both Player 2 
and 3 have to decide whether, conditional on the outcome, they reward the decision-maker. 
The experimental instructions can be found in Appendix C. 
 
Table 3.1: Summary of the Experimental Design 
1. Stage:   - random assignment of roles (Player 1, Player 2, and Player 3); 
no information about the differences between roles 
- subjects are informed that there will be a second stage and that 
payoffs will be based on decisions from the first stage 
- each subject makes 12 decisions about the distribution of 
earnings among players 
2. Stage:  New information: Player 1 is the decision-maker 
For each decision situation 
- Player 1 decides if he wants to delegate the decision right such 
that the choice of Player 2 is adopted 
- Players 2 and 3 can reward Player 1 by transferring points; 
transfer decisions are made conditional on the implemented 
option (strategy method) 
- incentivized expectation questions 
End of the experiment Questionnaire on demographics, BIG5 traits and risk aversion 
  
DELEGATION AND REWARDS 
51 
 
3.3.1 First Stage 
In the beginning of the preference elicitation stage subjects are randomly assigned to one of 
the three roles in which they remain for the entire experiment. However, they are not matched 
into groups until the second stage, and instructions for the first stage are identical for all 
players and across treatments. 
The purpose of the first stage is to elicit distributional preferences of subjects, in particular 
whether they are motivated by the equity and efficiency consequences of their choices. For 
this reason, subjects make a series of binary decisions between two payoff distributions. 
Option A, the equitable distribution, is the same in each round and corresponds to (100, 100, 
100), which means that each player receives 100 points if this option is the one to be 
implemented. With Option B, the unequal distribution (100, p, q) Player 1 again earns 100 
points, but the potential payoffs for Player 2 and Player 3 change in each round in a way that 
either p < 100 < q or p > 100 > q. In each round p and q vary over the following dimensions:  
(i) Advantage Player 2: whether Player 2 earns more than Player 3, or vice versa 
(ii) Efficiency: whether the sum of all payoffs from Option B is larger, equal to, or 
smaller than 300 points (the total payoff from Option A) 
(iii) Degree of inequality: whether the absolute gap between p and q is only 40 
points (e.g. 120 vs. 80), or 120 points (e.g. 40 vs. 160) 
Each subject makes 12 decisions. The respective payoffs under Option B are listed in 
Appendix A. In each session the order was randomized.  
At this time, subjects know the role in which they remain also for the second part. In addition, 
they had been informed at the beginning that it will be determined only in the second part 
whose decisions will be payoff-relevant in which round. However, they receive no further 
information about the decision mechanisms, so they have no strategic incentive not to reveal 
their preferred distributions. In particular, subjects do not yet know that Player 1 is the 
decision-maker and that Player 2 is in a more advantageous position than Player 3.  
A key feature of this setup is that Player 1 has no monetary incentive to bias his decision in 
favor of either Option A or B. This reflects the fact that an administrative or political 
decision-maker receives a fixed salary but no direct financial compensation for his decisions. 
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This is in contrast to Players 2 and 3, who have an obvious interest to influence the outcome, 
but no decision rights.  
 
3.3.2 Second Stage 
In the beginning of the second stage, subjects receive a new set of instructions. They learn 
that they will see the previous decision situations again, and that Player 1 is the key player. In 
each round Player 1 decides whether he wants his initial choice between options A and B to 
be relevant for determining the payoffs. Alternatively, he can replace his choice with the 
initial choice of Player 2 (but not Player 3) from the first part. The choice has to be made 
without knowing the actual decisions of the others.16 This setup introduces asymmetry 
between the self-interested players as it provides the decision-maker with an opportunity to do 
Player 2 a favor at the expense of Player 3, but not vice versa.17 
Players 2 and 3 can reward the decision-maker by sending a transfer. As all subjects have 
identical instructions, this is common knowledge from the beginning of the gift-giving stage 
on. In each round the player(s) with the highest earnings can make a transfer to Player 1, 
which is elicited via the strategy method, i.e. conditional on the implemented option. If 
Option B is implemented, one of the two self-interested players earns strictly more and only 
he makes a transfer decision. Following Abbink et al. (2002) and Malmendier and Schmidt 
(2011), the transfer is multiplied by 3 to reflect that a bribe or gift generally has a larger 
marginal utility for the receiver. If instead Option A is chosen, earnings are identical and both 
Player 2 and Player 3 make a transfer decision. Then the average transfer is multiplied by 3. 
In this way, the expected transfer of a decision-maker is identical across options, assuming 
Players 2 and 3 would always send the same amount.18 
                                                 
16 By taking the previously made decision instead of asking Player 2 again, we want to ensure that Player 1 
cannot justify favoring Player 2 by assuming that Player 2 would behave more pro-social if he knows that his 
decision determines the group outcome. 
17 We refer to Players 2 and 3 as “self-interested” players because they have something at stake already in the 
first stage, while Player 1 has by then no own financial interests by construction. However, this changes in the 
second stage when Player 1’s may very well be also guided by pure self-interest.   
18 Instead of using the average transfer of Player 2 and 3, we could have allowed that both players can make a 
transfer under B. However, a strictly disadvantaged player would probably not have rewarded Player 1 anyway – 
especially as there is no strategic benefit in doing so. Thus, this would have created an asymmetry between two 
possible senders under Option B vs. one possible plus one extremely unlikely sender under Option A. In this 
case, a risk averse decision-maker might have found Option A more appealing as it increases the likelihood of 
receiving a positive transfer. We thus decided to use the raw transfer of the higher earning individual under B 
and the average of both transfers under A. 
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Transfers can range between 0 and 25 points. The upper limit is imposed to ensure that 
extreme outliers do not bias the econometric results. Sending an amount equal to the 
maximum of 25 corresponds to a substantial transfer of between 15 and 25 percent of Player 
2’s or Player 3’s total earnings in a particular round. Therefore, it is unlikely that capping 
contributions at 25 imposes a strong restriction even on extremely reciprocally inclined 
subjects.  
After each choice, subjects answer incentivized expectation questions about the other players’ 
behavior. For each possible outcome, subjects in the role of Player 1 have to state their beliefs 
as to whether the other players have made a transfer.  Player 2 and Player 3 have to state their 
beliefs about which option Player 1 has initially chosen and whether he has decided to stick to 
his initial decision or instead accepted the choice of Player 2. Each correct prediction is 
rewarded with 10 additional points. At the end of the experiment, subjects complete a short 
questionnaire with socio-demographic questions, a self-reported risk aversion question, and 
the compact BIG-5 module with 15 questions developed for the German Socioeconomic 
Panel.  
Due to the tripled transfers to Player 1 this experiment bears resemblance to the popular trust 
game of Berg et al. (1995), but note that there are two crucial differences. First, our game 
introduces negative externalities. Thus, the equivalent of trustor and trustee can increase their 
respective payoffs only at the expense of a third party. Second, the trustor does not make an 
investment in the classical sense, i.e. there is no monetary payment to the trustee. However, 
what she does “invest” is her preferred allocation and thus her notion of fairness.  
 
3.3.3 Treatments 
A bribing relationship can be either a one-shot interaction or a repeated situation. Abbink 
(2004) has shown that this makes a difference in a classical corruption setting, and finds that 
the level of corruption is significantly higher with partner matching compared to stranger 
matching. We were thus interested in how repeated interaction affects the degree to which the 
weak position of Player 3 is exploited and whether it fosters the bond between the two 
“partners-in-crime” in the gift-exchange. Therefore, we conducted the experiment under two 
treatment conditions – Partner vs. Stranger. The first stage was identical for both treatments 
because subjects had no information about how groups would be formed. In the second stage, 
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the Partner treatment assigned subjects to the same group in each round, while they were 
always matched with different persons in the Stranger treatment. 
Theoretically, there is no reason why the matching protocol should make a difference for 
purely selfish individuals. Unlike in repeated public goods games, for example, there is no 
possibility to build up reputation because we do not provide information about other players’ 
actions during the experiment. We do this in order to keep the number of independent 
observations identical across treatments. Also, in real-life situation it can sometimes be 
difficult or even impossible for the gift-giver to observe whether a public official has already 
carried out the favorable act on behalf of the gift-giver, e.g. when votes are cast anonymously.  
What the treatment variation changes, however, is the degree of responsibility for the outcome 
of others, because a decision-maker can hide behind the veil of ignorance in the Stranger 
treatment. Even if he makes a very harmful decision at the expense of Player 3 he may 
convince himself that other decision-makers treat Player 3 better than he did. In the Partner 
setup, however, an opportunistic decision-maker would always disadvantage the same person, 
thus being fully responsible for the poor outcome of Player 3.  
 
3.3.4 Implementation 
We conducted in total 6 sessions (3 in Partner, 3 in Stranger) at MELESSA, the experimental 
lab at the University of Munich, and all participants were university students from various 
disciplines.19 The experiment was computerized with the software z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). 
Most sessions were conducted with 21 subjects, but due to non-show-up one Partner session 
was conducted with 18 and one Stranger session with 15 subjects. Subjects earned points 
which were converted at an exchange rate of 1 Euro for 150 points. Average earnings were 13 
Euros, and each session lasted approximately 50 minutes. 
 
  
                                                 
19 Recruitment of subjects was done with the software Orsee (Greiner, 2004). 
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3.4 Behavioral Predictions 
In the first stage each subject makes several choices between the equitable distribution A and 
the unequal distribution B. By design, there is always one of the self-interested players who is 
better off with the unequal option, and one who is worse off. In contrast, Player 1 is in a 
neutral position and earns the same in both cases. Therefore, his decisions should reflect 
purely distributional preferences, in particular how the trade-off between equity and 
efficiency is evaluated. If Player 1 is sufficiently inequality averse, he will always opt for 
Option A. However, in cases when B yields a higher overall payoff a decision-maker with 
preferences for efficiency may consider deviating from the equality-preserving choice.  
Conjecture 1: Player 2 and Player 3 choose B if their own payoff is higher than with A. 
Player 1 only deviates from the equitable distribution if the unequal option results in 
efficiency gains.  
At the beginning of the second stage, Player 1 learns that he can rule his distributional 
decision from the first stage irrelevant and instead adopt the preferred option of Player 2. For 
a purely benevolent decision-maker there is no reason why this possibility would be 
appealing, since adopting the partisan choice of Player 2 is unlikely to result in a better 
outcome in terms of efficiency and equity. In the absence of rewards, an entirely selfish 
decision-maker should be indifferent between sticking to his own and Player 2’s previous 
choice. When there is scope for rewards, however, the decision-maker may strategically favor 
Player 2 in the hope that his action will be reciprocated. 
Conjecture 2: With the possibility of being rewarded, decision-makers will strategically 
delegate the decision right to increase their own payoff if Player 2 is the one who benefits 
from giving up the equity-preserving option.  
Whether this kind of strategic behavior pays off for Player 1 depends on the reciprocal 
inclinations of the Player 2 subjects. As there is no feedback during the experiment, there is 
also no way to build up reputation, not even in the Partner treatment. Thus, the transfer 
decisions have no strategic component and an entirely self-interested player would always 
choose to send zero points. Positive transfers reflect purely reciprocal intentions.  
Conjecture 3: As it is individually rational to send nothing, we expect a large proportion of 
zero transfers. However, most individuals are reciprocally inclined at least to some degree. 
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We thus expect that the transfers of Players 2 and 3 increase in their own earnings from the 
implemented option.  
Finally, our experimental design allows us to test whether the introduction of a rewards 
channel changes the aggregate outcome for a group. If the presumably benevolent decision of 
Player 1 is replaced by a decision which was not made in the best interest of all, the society as 
a whole might be worse off. 
Conjecture 4: Introducing the possibility that a decision-maker can favor a self-interested 
party in exchange for a reward leads to worse aggregate outcomes. 
In the next section we will evaluate each of these conjectures in turn. 
 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 First Stage 
With 117 subjects making 12 decisions about their preferred allocations we obtain a sample of 
1404 single decisions. Due to the symmetric setting, we have 702 single decisions in cases 
when Option B is better for Player 2 and Player 3, respectively. As mentioned in the previous 
section, we expect that Players 2 and 3 generally opt for B when they earn more from it, while 
Player 1 seeks a compromise between equity and efficiency. Table 3.2 provides a summary of 
choices in the first stage. More detailed information about the choice frequencies for each 
decision situation can be found in Appendix A.  
 
Table 3.2: Choices in the Preference Elicitation Stage 
 Frequency of choosing B (in percent) 
 total advantage Player 2 advantage Player 3 
Player 1 13.67 12.39 14.96 
Player 2 46.37 89.74 2.99 
Player 3 46.15 2.99 89.31 
#choices 1404 702 702 
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The comparison across roles reveals that subjects in the role of Player 1 were generally 
reluctant to implement inequality. They opted for B only with 13.67 percent even though in 
one third of the situations it would actually have been efficiency enhancing. However, the 
desire to maintain equity seems to have been sufficiently strong to choose A in most cases. 
This result demonstrates neatly that subjects with no personal stakes in a distribution decision 
hardly ever sacrifice equity between the other involved parties. In contrast, the self-interested 
players clearly opted for B if it was to their advantage – 89.74% of Players 2 and 89.31% of 
Players 3 did so – and clearly avoided B if it was to their disadvantage, with a probability of 
being chosen of less than 3% for both of them.  
These results show that Players 2 and 3 have very similar distributional preferences. In 
addition, we also see that Player 1 did not favor one person at the expense of the other, as the 
probability of choosing B does not depend on who gains more from it.  
In the next step we estimate probit models in which the dependent variable is 1 if a subject 
chooses B, i.e. deviates from the equitable distribution, with standard errors clustered by 
individual to account for error dependence across periods. The first column of Table 3.3 uses 
only the choices of subjects in the role of Player 1, the second column only those of Players 2 
and 3. The regressions include two dummies indicating whether the choice of B over A results 
in an overall efficiency gain/loss; an inequality dummy for a large payoff gap between Player 
2 and Player 3 (a difference of 120 vs. 40 points); a “treatment” dummy (but recall that there 
is no treatment difference in the first stage); and a control for period effects. In addition, the 
first regression includes a dummy for whether it is Player 2 or Player 3 who has an advantage 
from B. The second regression instead includes the amount to be earned with option B (which 
is omitted in column (1) as there is no variation for Player 1). 
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Table 3.3: Probit Model for Chosen Option; Dependent Variable = 1 if Option B 
 (1)  
Player 1 
     (2) 
Players 2&3 
constant -1.229*** 
(0.352) 
-5.182*** 
(0.858) 
advantage Player 2 (0/1) 0.129 
(0.085) 
     - 
      
Option B earnings      - 
      
0.051*** 
(0.009) 
efficiency 20 plus (0/1) 0.797*** 
(0.240) 
-0.078 
(0.176) 
efficiency 20 minus (0/1) 0.140 
(0.097) 
-0.028 
(0.110) 
gap large (0/1) -0.087 
(0.148) 
-1.392*** 
(0.515) 
stranger treatment (0/1) -0.037 
(0.317) 
-0.112 
(0.172) 
period -0.019 
(0.021) 
0.006 
(0.017) 
N 468 936 
log-likelihood -173.8 -239.9 
Notes: Standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
The results clearly demonstrate that Player 1’s main motive for implementing an unequal 
allocation by choosing B over A is to increase total efficiency. The degree of inequality, i.e. if 
the gap is 120 or only 40 points, does not play a role. Also whether it is Player 2 or Player 3 
who benefits from Option B does not influence the decision of Player 1, which again confirms 
that in this symmetric setting the decision-maker acts as a neutral and benevolent authority. 
Turning to the decisions of Players 2 and 3, the potential earnings under Option B are a highly 
significant predictor for preferring the unequal option (with p-value < 0.001). However, this 
selfish motive is moderated by the significantly negative influence of the size of the gap 
between Players 2 and 3, which reflects a concern for others. Efficiency gains or losses do not 
seem to be important. The “treatment” dummy is insignificant in both regressions, which 
indicates that subjects are comparable in terms of social preferences across treatments. 
Finally, as Player 1 subjects make decisions in which they have nothing to gain at this stage, 
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one might be concerned that they get less attentive over time and make their decisions less 
thoughtfully as the experiment progresses, but we find no time effects which would 
substantiate this concern. 
Result 1: Players 2 and 3 generally choose the option which maximizes their payoff, although 
a large degree of inequality moderates selfish behavior. Player 1 wants to preserve equity and 
does not favor one at the expense of the other; he only deviates from the equity-preserving 
option if the alternative allocation results in efficiency gains.  
 
3.5.2 Second Stage: Delegation Decisions of Player 1 
In this section we investigate how decision-makers react to the new information that they can 
do Player 2 a favor by ex-post delegating the decision right about the payable option. 
Conditional on having chosen A in the first stage, decision-makers decide to render their own 
decision irrelevant with a probability of 38.61% and instead let payoffs be determined by the 
first stage decision of Player 2. In the less likely case that a decision-maker has opted for B in 
the preference elicitation stage, the percentage is only slightly higher, at 43.75%. Based on the 
observed frequencies, a Pearson’s chi-squared test does not reject the hypothesis that the 
delegation decision is independent of Player 1’s initial choice in Stage 1 (p-value = 0.434). Of 
course, this comparison of percentages is not informative about the underlying incentives in 
each decision situation, which is why we turn to regression analysis in the next step.  
Table 3.4 contains results for 3 different probit regressions. The dependent variable is equal to 
1 if Player 1 delegated his decision right. In column (1) we regress it on the same variables 
used for the estimations reported in Table 3.3. In column (2) we add Player 1’s beliefs about 
possible transfers from Players 2 and 3, elicited after each round. Finally, column (3) adds a 
set of demographic and behavioral covariates.  
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Table 3.4: Probit Regression; Dependent Variable = 1 if Player 1 Delegates 
       (1)    (2)    (3) 
constant -0.990*** 
(0.199) 
-1.486*** 
(0.229) 
-2.899*** 
(0.829) 
advantage Player 2 (0/1) 0.775*** 
(0.184) 
0.809*** 
(0.216) 
0.834*** 
(0.224) 
efficiency 20 plus (0/1) 0.240* 
(0.128) 
0.191 
(0.135) 
0.215 
(0.139) 
efficiency 20 minus (0/1) -0.195 
(0.150) 
-0.116 
(0.152) 
-0.123 
(0.158) 
gap large (0/1) 0.220 
(0.134) 
0.071 
(0.138) 
0.062 
(0.146) 
stranger treatment (0/1) 0.357* 
(0.184) 
0.262 
(0.174) 
-0.027 
(0.309) 
period -0.000 
(0.015) 
0.015 
(0.018) 
0.017 
(0.015) 
belief receiving transfer from 
2 or 3 if Option B (0/1) 
 0.669*** 
(0.189) 
0.716*** 
(0.159) 
belief receiving transfer from 
2 if Option A (0/1) 
 0.066 
(0.236) 
0.101 
(0.208) 
belief receiving transfer from 
3 if Option A (0/1) 
 0.052 
(0.235) 
0.106 
(0.219) 
demographics, risk aversion & 
BIG5 
NO NO YES 
N 468 468 468 
Log-likelihood -284.2           -271.8             -258.3    
Notes: Standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; column (3) 
includes controls for age, gender, lab experience, study major, self-reported risk aversion and BIG5 traits. 
 
In comparison to the first stage, the most striking result is that despite the symmetric setup of 
payments, the dummy variable which indicates an advantage for Player 2 from Option B is 
now highly significant. This is due to the non-symmetric setup of the delegation decision. 
Regardless of who gains more from inequality, the decision-maker can only guarantee that the 
option preferred by Player 2 is implemented, but not the option preferred by Player 3. Helping 
to impose an unequal distribution might be explained by the anticipation of potential rewards.  
We investigate this hypothesis more thoroughly by adding the decision-makers’ beliefs about 
receiving transfers from Players 2 and 3. We find that the expectation of receiving a reward 
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from the Player who gained more from B is positively and significantly associated with 
renouncing one’s initial choice. Whether the decision-maker expects to receive a reward from 
either player if option A is implemented does not seem to be important. By adding beliefs, the 
initially significant effect of potential efficiency gains from choosing B becomes insignificant, 
and the spurious correlation with the treatment dummy vanishes. Whether subjects interact 
with partners or strangers has no effect on their decision to implement the preferred option of 
Player 2. Finally, adding further demographic and behavioral covariates does not reveal 
statistically significant associations, with the exceptions that more risk tolerant subjects are 
more likely to delegate and more conscientious persons are less likely to do so (coefficients 
not reported).  
Result 2: In anticipation of potential rewards, decision-makers act opportunistically and are 
significantly more likely to delegate their decision-right if Player 2 gains from inequality. 
 
3.5.3 Second Stage: Transfer Decisions 
As transfers were elicited via the strategy method, subjects in the role of Player 2 and Player 3 
had to make decisions conditional on Option A or B being the relevant outcome. Subjects 
could transfer any integer number of points between 0 and 25 to the decision-maker. A purely 
self-interested subject would always choose a transfer of 0, because her actions are not 
observable for other players. Note that this holds even in the Partner treatment. A positive 
transfer therefore reflects reciprocal intentions without any strategic considerations.  
Figures 3.1 & 3.2 show that indeed the most frequent choice was to send nothing – in around 
70 percent of cases when the final outcome was Option A and with around 40 percent in case 
it was Option B. However, there is also a nontrivial number of relatively high transfers, with 
multiples of 5 as focal points.  
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Figure 3.1: Transfer Conditional on Player 1 Choosing Option A 
 
Figure 3.2: Transfer Conditional on Player 1 Choosing Option B 
 
Table 3.5 displays mean transfers by option and role. In case Option A was implemented, 
Player 2 transferred 2.81 points on average, which is slightly more than the 2.11 points of 
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Player 3 but the difference is statistically indistinguishable. A different picture emerges with 
transfers conditional on Option B being implemented. Again the average transfer of Player 2 
is larger, but this time the difference is more pronounced (6.96 vs. 4.97 points) and 
statistically significant (p-value = 0.003). Thus, from the perspective of the decision-maker, 
helping to implement Option A earned him on average 7.39 points (the average group transfer 
of 2.46 multiplied by 3), while he earned 5.97*3 = 17.90 points when Option B was 
implemented.  
 
Table 3.5: Transfers Sent by Players 2 and 3 Conditional on Implemented Option  
Amount sent Mean Std. Dev. N Percentage of 
zero transfers 
if Option A 
implemented 
Player 2 2.81 5.53 468 64.10 % 
Player 3 2.12 5.25 468 74.79 % 
Group average 2.47 5.40 936 69.45 % 
if Option B 
implemented 
Player 2  6.96 7.37 234 29.49 % 
Player 3  4.97 6.87 234 47.01 % 
Group average 5.97 7.19 468 38.25 % 
 
As the individually rational strategy for a selfish subject would be to never transfer anything, 
we can further look at subjects individually and classify them in the spirit of the “conditional 
co-operator” vs. “free-rider” distinction of Fischbacher et al. (2001).20 In total 23.1 percent of 
Players 2 and 3 (i.e. 18 out of 78) are completely “selfish” across all 12 decision situations. 
Table 3.6 further displays the fraction of subjects that never send any transfer, conditioned on 
the implemented option. Two interesting aspects become evident from this table: (i) Player 3 
is more likely to be completely unwilling to send a transfer and (ii) regardless of their role, 
subjects are less likely to never reward conditioned on Option B as opposed to Option A. 
  
                                                 
20 The equivalent of conditional co-operation in this context is to send a positive transfer in case the implemented 
option is to one’s own advantage, while a free-rider is a subject who never sends a transfer regardless of the 
outcome.  
DELEGATION AND REWARDS 
64 
 
Table 3.6: Fraction of Subjects that Never Transfer, Conditional on Chosen Option 
Person 2 Person 3 
If Option is A If Option is B If Option is A If Option is B 
28.21 % 17.95 % 48.72 % 33.3 % 
 
We next turn to the determinants of transfer choices. As mentioned before, transfers were 
censored at 25 in order to avoid extreme outliers. As we did not allow transfers to be negative, 
they were also naturally censored from below at 0. We thus use a two-limit Tobit model to 
account for the double censoring, but a one-limit Tobit model with censoring at zero or 
conventional OLS regressions yield very similar results.21  
The pattern of transfers suggests that reciprocity (positive as well as negative) is the key to 
subjects’ choices. When making the transfer decision conditional on Option A being chosen, 
the earnings for the counterfactual outcome B has a significantly negative effect. In contrast, 
when Option B is implemented, the rewards that Players 2 and 3 send to the decision-maker 
are increasing in their earnings. Perhaps surprisingly, beliefs about the decision-maker’s 
choices in both stages hardly have an effect, with the notable exception that Player 2 subjects 
send a significantly larger reward if they believe that the decision-maker delegated the 
decision right to implement their own preferred option. So Player 2 seems to recognize the 
favor and is willing to reciprocate. Again there are no time effects, and treatment differences 
are mostly insignificant but it is interesting to observe that Player 2 tends to send more in the 
Partner treatment, while Player 3 sends less. 
  
                                                 
21 The results are available upon request. 
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Table 3.7: Two-limit Tobit-Regressions for Transfers Decisions of Players 2 and 3 
 Transfer if outcome is 
Option A Option B 
Player 2 Player 3 Player 2 Player 3 
Constant 1.087 
(13.44) 
41.81 
(27.5) 
-6.767 
(10.84) 
8.143 
(20.57) 
Option B earnings -0.138*** 
(0.036) 
-0.133*** 
(0.037) 
0.107*** 
(0.036) 
0.147*** 
(0.052) 
gap large (0/1) 2.066** 
(0.951) 
0.167 
(1.39) 
2.583 
(1.943) 
0.294 
(2.145) 
period 0.120 
(0.183) 
-0.178 
(0.162) 
0.002 
(0.134) 
-0.111 
(0.183) 
stranger treatment (0/1) 2.603 
(3.779) 
-4.618 
(4.27) 
1.202 
(3.24) 
-7.839** 
(3.775) 
Belief Option B was     Player 
1’s initial choice (0/1) 
3.31* 
(1.939) 
0.696 
(2.669) 
1.92 
(2.118) 
2.263 
(2.502) 
Belief Player 1 delegated 
decision (0/1) 
2.665 
(1.86) 
-1.45 
(2.436) 
3.951** 
(1.726) 
0.572 
(2.852) 
N 468 468 234 234 
Notes: Standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Tobit 
regressions include controls for age, gender, lab experience, and study major. 
 
 
Result 3: While a nontrivial fraction of subjects (23.1 percent) never sends any transfer to the 
decision-maker, the majority of subjects is conditionally cooperative and sends rewards 
which increase in their own earnings. 
 
Setting an upper limit does not impose a restriction on most subjects’ choices (there are only 
3.56 percent of 25 point transfers) but we observe a large fraction of zero transfers. In order to 
take into account that the excess zeroes could be generated by a different process than the 
transfer choices, we estimate a two-part model with a probit regression in the first stage, and 
OLS in the second stage. The results of the two-part estimation are consistent with the two-
limit Tobit model and can be found in Appendix B.  
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3.5.4 Earnings Comparison 
In this section we investigate whether a strategy based on mutual gift-giving can serve as a 
worthwhile alternative for the two partners-in-crime of a bribery relationship. To this end, we 
make several comparisons of the average per-round earnings for each player and the total sum 
of per-round earnings, displayed in Table 3.8. In column (1) we see the players’ payoffs for 
the hypothetical situation that the experiment had ended after the first stage. In other words, 
this is an earnings comparison based on the decision-maker’s social preferences in the 
absence of strategic considerations. By construction, the decision-maker earns exactly 100 
points each round. The other two players earn significantly more but their earnings are 
statistically indistinguishable across roles (p-value = 0.979), which reflects that most 
decision-makers want to maximize social welfare and opt for the efficiency enhancing option, 
but have no intention to discriminate against any of the players.  
 
Table 3.8: Comparison of Average Earnings per Round by Experimental Roles 
 
 
 
Player 
(1) 
Hypothetical earnings 
given Stage 1 choice 
of Player 1 
(2) 
Earnings without 
incentive questions 
and transfers 
(3) 
Earnings without 
incentive questions 
1 100 100 111.96 
2 117.91 109.72 105.44 
3 117.86 92.20 90.81 
Total Earnings 335.77 301.92 308.21 
p-value for test of  
H0: identical earnings 
for 2 and 3 
 
0.979 
 
<0.001 
 
<0.001 
 
 
However, after the gift-giving opportunity is revealed, an entirely different picture emerges. 
Column (2) contains the actual average “raw” earnings (i.e. net of transfer payments and 
points for correct guesses in the incentivized questions) after stage 2. In the absence of 
transfers, the decision-makers’ earnings remain at 100 points per round. In contrast, Players 2 
and 3 now earn less than before, and a large and statistically highly significant (p-value < 
0.001) gap has opened up between them. This demonstrates that with potential rewards the 
decision-maker now clearly favors Player 2 at the expense of Player 3, even though it 
drastically reduces total welfare. From column (3) it becomes evident that this strategy 
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actually pays off for the subjects in the role of Player 1, because when transfers are taken into 
account they can increase their earnings from 100 points to almost 112 points. This leads us to 
our final result which concludes this section.  
Result 4: Compared to a situation in which the decision-maker acts in the best interest of all 
players, the introduction of a favor vs. reward exchange increases the payoff for Player 2 
relative to Player 3, but reduces aggregate welfare because of negative externalities for the 
disadvantaged party. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
Our experiment demonstrates that even when there is no feasible coordination mechanism 
between a potential briber and a bribee, the anticipation of an uncertain future reward can lead 
to biased decisions of a supposedly neutral decision-maker. The role of expectations is 
sufficiently strong to produce an outcome similar to what might have been expected by 
conventional corruption. This shows that even a non-contractible exchange of gifts can serve 
as a viable bribery substitute for lobbying parties who prefer to refrain from illegal acts. 
However, this favor trading leads to negative externalities for the less influential side and 
reduces aggregate welfare.  
From a policy perspective, the results suggest to broaden the focus of anti-corruption policies 
to include measures which increase the uncertainty that a favor can ever be reciprocated. 
Especially the imposition of a waiting period between leaving a political office and taking up 
a private job and the prolongation of existing waiting periods should be considered. What 
these results also suggest, however, is that even when lobbying is regulated with clearly 
defined rules it might be ineffective if lobbyists and decision-makers circumvent the 
limitations by pursuing the strategy we examined in this experiment. 
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Appendix A: Options and Choices 
 
Table 3.9: Overview of Options and Choice Frequencies 
 Payoffs with Option B for  
Player 
Efficiency  
relative to 
Option A 
Absolute 
gap between 
2 and 3 
% of Players choosing  
Option B 
Round 1 2 3 1 2 3 
1 100 120 80 0 40 10.26 94.87 2.56 
2 100 30 150 –20 120 12.82 0 84.62 
3 100 130 90 +20 40 28.21 97.44 10.26 
4 100 110 70 –20 40 7.69 76.92 0 
5 100 160 40 0 120 2.56 87.18 0 
6 100 170 50 +20 120 15.38 94.87 5.13 
7 100 70 110 –20 40 5.13 2.56 71.79 
8 100 90 130 +20 40 28.21 12.82 97.44 
9 100 80 120 0 40 7.69 0 97.44 
10 100 50 170 +20 120 28.21 2.56 94.87 
11 100 40 160 0 120 7.69 0 89.74 
12 100 150 30 –20 120 10.26 87.18 0 
Mean 100 100 100 0 80 13.67 46.37 46.15 
Note: in each session the order was randomly determined. 
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Appendix B: Additional Regression Results 
 
Table 3.10: Two Part Model for Transfer Decisions 
Part 1: Probit (transfer>0) 
 
 
Transfer if outcome is 
Option A Option B 
Player 2 
   (1) 
Player 3 
   (2) 
Player 2 
   (3) 
Player 3 
   (4) 
constant -0.325  
(1.423) 
2.508  
(2.253) 
-2.493  
(1.748) 
0.702 
(2.831) 
 
Option B earnings -0.012*** 
(0.002) 
-0.008*** 
(0.002) 
0.0055  
(0.007) 
0.007  
(0.008) 
gap large (0/1) 0.122  
(0.095) 
-0.104  
(0.107) 
0.0369  
(0.293) 
0.042 
(0.291) 
period -0.002  
(0.019) 
-0.019 
(0.0148) 
0.006  
(0.026) 
-0.009  
(0.023) 
stranger treatment (0/1) 0.196  
(0.408) 
-0.357  
(0.351) 
0.5053  
(0.493) 
-0.937** 
(0.428) 
Belief Option B was     Player 
1’s initial choice (0/1) 
0.170  
(0.408) 
-0.0263 
(0.180) 
0.267  
(0.310) 
0.320  
(0.334) 
Belief Player 1 delegated 
decision (0/1) 
0.131  
(0.186) 
-0.166  
(0.199) 
0.119  
(0.274) 
-0.073  
(0.337)    
N 468 468 234 234 
Log-likelihood -253.6 -116.3 -233.2 -139.5 
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Part 2: OLS conditional on transfer > 0 
 Transfer if outcome is 
Option A Option B 
Player 2 
   (5) 
Player 3 
   (6) 
Player 2 
   (7) 
Player 3 
   (8) 
Constant 13.57  
(8.432) 
73.42*** 
(13.67) 
0.509  
(8.94) 
15.94  
(12.64) 
 
Option B earnings -0.041** 
(0.016) 
-0.050** 
(0.019) 
0.142*** 
(0.036) 
0.181*** 
(0.058) 
gap large (0/1) 2.200**  
(0.900) 
1.760  
(1.059) 
1.224  
(1.701) 
-1.450 
(2.218) 
period 0.152  
(0.167) 
-0.004  
(0.200) 
0.014  
(0.117) 
0.138  
(0.173) 
stranger treatment (0/1) 1.087  
(2.515) 
3.474* 
(1.817) 
-0.408  
(2.077) 
0.485 
(2.203) 
Belief Option B was     Player 
1’s initial choice (0/1) 
3.484** 
(1.522) 
1.733  
(1.959) 
0.463  
(1.063) 
-0.276  
(1.686) 
Belief Player 1 delegated 
decision (0/1) 
1.885*  
(1.009) 
0.036  
(1.151) 
3.037*** 
(0.996) 
0.952  
(1.747) 
N 168 165 118 124 
R-squared 0.286 0.426 0.527 0.360 
Notes: Standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01;  
Regressions in both parts include controls for age, gender, lab experience, and study major. 
 
Summary: Conditional on Option A being the outcome, there is a negative and highly 
significant relationship between the probability of sending a positive transfer and the foregone 
earnings under the alternative option (columns 1 and 2). In other words, Players 2 and 3 
refuse to reward the decision-maker for Option A if they would have preferred the 
counterfactual. We have seen before that subjects generally transfer more under B, but the 
binary transfer choice does not depend significantly on the points earned (column 3 and 4). In 
Part 2, we again observe the same “punishment” pattern as under A (columns 5 and 6). 
Conditional on B, the amount earned is now a highly significant predictor for the transferred 
points (columns 7 and 8), so the more an outcome is beneficial for Player 2, the higher is the 
expected reward for the decision-maker. As in the one-step estimation, none of the other 
covariates has a consistently significant influence on any of the two choice components.  
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Appendix C: Instructions 
Welcome to the experiment and thank you for your participation! Please read the following 
instructions carefully. They are identical for all participants, so you will receive the same 
information as the other participants. The decisions that you and others make in this 
experiment will determine your earnings, which will be paid to you in cash at the end of the 
experiment. In addition, you will receive 4 Euros for showing up in time. 
During the experiment you are not allowed to communicate with others, use mobile devices, 
or run other programs on your PC. If you fail to comply with these rules, we have to exclude 
you from the experiment and all the payoffs. If you have a question, please raise your hand. 
We will then come to your seat and answer your question in private. If the question is relevant 
for all participants, we will repeat and answer the question for all participants. 
During this experiment we will refer not to Euros, but to points. At the end of the experiment 
your total points over all rounds will be converted to Euros at an exchange rate of  
150 points = 1 Euro 
The experiment consists of two parts. In the first part you will have to make a number of 
decisions. Which of them are relevant for your payoff will be determined in the second stage. 
You will be informed about the rules for the second part after the first part is completed. 
 
Instructions for Part 1: 
In this experiment there will be three roles, which we will refer to as Player 1, Player 2, and 
Player 3. You will be randomly allocated to one of these roles at the beginning of the 
experiment, and remain in the same role until the end. 
 
The decision situation: 
In this experiment you will have to make a series of decisions. Each decision consists of a 
choice between 2 possible options: Option A and Option B. The two options denote different 
possible payoffs for each player involved. 
 
Example 1: 
 OPTION A OPTION B 
Player 1 100 100 
Player 2 100 120 
Player 3 100 80 
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With Option A each person earns 100 points. With option B, Player 1 earns 100 points, Player 
2 earns 120 points, and Player 3 earns 80 points. 
 
Before you start, the computer will randomly determine your role. Then you will make a 
series of decisions in which Option A will always result in 100 points for all players. With 
Option B the payoffs will vary in each round. Depending on your role, you may prefer either 
Option A or Option B. Whose decision will be relevant for your earnings will only be 
determined in the second part of the experiment. 
 
Test: 
 OPTION A OPTION B 
Player 1 100 100 
Player 2 ??? 40 
Player 3 100 160 
 
Suppose you are Player 3: How many points would you get with Option B?  _____ 
Suppose you are Player 1: How many points would you get with Option A?  _____ 
Suppose you are Player 2: How many points would you get with Option B?  _____ 
Suppose you are Player 2: How many points would you get with Option A?   _____ 
 
Instructions for Part 2: 
In this part of the experiment it will be determined which option will be paid in which round. 
You can earn additional points by correctly answering some questions about which decisions 
you expect others to have taken. The sum of your points over all rounds constitutes your 
earnings. 
On your screen you will now see the same decision situations as in the first part, in identical 
order. As before, you will see the decision situation on the left hand side. On the right hand 
side you can make your decisions for this part and answer the questions to increase your 
payoff. You will not receive any information about the decisions of other participants, neither 
during nor after the experiment. 
[Only Stranger:] For each round, groups consisting of one Player 1, one Player 2, and one 
Player 3 will be randomly formed. In each round, the groups will be formed anew. 
[Only Partner:] In the first round of this part, a group consisting of one Player 1, one Player 
2, and one Player 3 will be randomly formed. You will remain in this group until the end of 
the experiment. 
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The Decision of Player 1: 
The person which decides about the option to be implemented is Player 1. As you have seen 
in the first part, Player 1 earns 100 points regardless of which option is chosen. 
Now Player 1 has two possible choices: 
1. He/she can decide that his/her initial choice from Part 1 remains valid 
2. He/she can decide that instead the choice of Player 2 from Part 1 will be valid (without 
knowing, which option has actually been by Player 2). 
 
Example 2: 
 OPTION A OPTION B 
Player 1 100 100 
Player 2 100 120 
Player 3 100 80 
 
Suppose Player 1 has chosen Option A in Part 1, while Player 2 has chosen Option B. 
Player 1 will now receive the following information on the screen: 
 
YOUR DECISION WAS  A 
Do you instead prefer the choice of Player 2 to be valid? 
□ YES   
□ NO 
 
If Player 1 opts for NO, his/her initial choice remains valid. Here this would be option A. In 
this case, each player in the group earns 100 points. 
If Player 1 opts for YES, the initial choice of Player 2 will become valid. Here this would be 
option B. In this case, Player 1 earns 100 points, Player 2 120 points, and Player 3 80 points. 
 
The Decision of Player 2 and Player 3: 
After each round, the person with the highest earnings in this round (or both Player 2 and 
Player 3, in case they earn the same) can transfer part of their earnings to Player 1.  
Player 2 and Player 3 will have to make this decision without actually knowing, which option 
will be valid in a particular round. In other words, both decide how much they want to transfer 
to Player 1 if Option A will be relevant for payoff, AND how much they want to transfer to 
Player 1 if Option B will be relevant for payoff. 
 
 
DELEGATION AND REWARDS 
74 
 
If Option A is relevant for Payoff: 
In this case, Player 2 and Player 3 earn 100 points each. Both earn the same, so both can make 
a transfer between 0 and 25 points to Person 1. The transfers of Player 2 and Player 3 are 
multiplied by 1.5 (i.e. the average transfer is multiplied by 3), and transferred to Player 1. 
 
If Option B is relevant for Payoff: 
Case 1: Player 2 earns more with Option B than Player 3 (as in example 1) 
In this case, Player 2 can transfer between 0 and 25 points to Player 1. The transfer will be 
multiplied by 3 and transferred to Player 1. Player 3 has no decision to make. 
Case 2: Player 3 earns more with Option B than Player 2 (as in the following example) 
 
Example 3: 
 OPTION A OPTION B 
Player 1 100 100 
Player 2 100 80 
Player 3 100 120 
 
In this case, Player 3 can transfer between 0 and 25 points to Player 1. The transfer will be 
multiplied by 3 and transferred to Player 1. Player 2 has no decision to make. 
After each round, you will be asked to guess what the other players in your group decided, 
and you can earn additional points for each correct guess. If you are Player 1 you will be 
asked to guess which transfers Player 2 or Player 3 made. As Player 2 and Player 3 you will 
be asked to guess which option Player 1 has initially chosen and whether he/she has decided 
to stick to his initial choice. Think carefully before you answer – each correct guess will earn 
you 10 additional points.  
 
Summary: 
Player 1 decides for each decision situation whether his/her initially chosen option will be 
relevant for payoff, or whether instead the option chosen by Player 2 is relevant. 
Player 2 and Player 3 decide for each decision situation how many points (0-25) they want to 
transfer to Player 1, both in case that Player 1 has chosen Option A and in case Player 1 has 
chosen Option B. 
[Only Stranger:] In each round you will be randomly allocated to a new group of three.  
[Only Partner:] In each round you will interact with the same group members.  
After the last round, all your points will be added up and converted. Then you will have to 
complete a short questionnaire and you will receive your earnings.   
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Consider again some of the examples from above:  
 
Example 1 (cont’d): 
 OPTION A OPTION B 
Player 1 100 100 
Player 2 100 120 
Player 3 100 80 
 
Option A will be the valid option  
- If Player 1 has initially chosen Option A and decides in Part 2 that it remains valid  
- If Player 1 decides that instead the choice of Player 2 is decisive, and Player 2 has 
initially chosen Option A. 
In this case, both Player 2 and Player 3 can make a transfer between 0 and 25 points to Player 
1, e.g. transfer of Player 2: 5 points and transfer of Player 3: 15 points 
Both transfers are multiplied by 1.5 and the earnings from this round are: 
- Player 1: 100 + 1,5*5 + 1,5*15 = 130 
- Player 2: 100 – 5 = 95 
- Player 3: 100 – 15 = 85 
 
Option B will be the valid option  
- If Player 1 has initially chosen Option B, and decides in Part 2 that it remains valid  
- If Player 1 decides that instead the choice of Player 2 is decisive, and Player 2 has 
initially chosen Option B. 
In this case, Player 2 earns more than Player 3 and can make a transfer between 0 and 25 
points to Player 1, e.g. transfer of Player 2: 25 points 
The transfer of Player 2 is multiplied by 3 and the earnings from this round are: 
- Player 1: 100 + 3*25 = 175 
- Player 2: 120 – 25 = 95 
- Player 3: 80 
 
Example 3 (cont’d): 
 OPTION A OPTION B 
Player 1 100 100 
Player 2 100 80 
Player 3 100 120 
 
Suppose Option A is valid. In this case, both Player 2 and Player 3 can transfer between 0 and 
25 points to Player 1, e.g. transfer of Player 2: 0 points and transfer of Player 3: 20 points 
Both transfers are multiplied by 1.5 and the earnings from this round are: 
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- Player 1: 100 + 1,5*0 + 1,5*20 = 130 
- Player 2: 100 – 0 = 100 
- Player 3: 100 – 20 = 80 
Now suppose that instead Option B is valid. In this case, Player 3 earns more than Player 2 
and can make a transfer between 0 and 25 points to Player 1, e.g. transfer of Player 3: 6 points 
The transfer of Player 3 is multiplied by 3 and the earnings from this round are: 
- Player 1: 100 + 3*6 = 118 
- Player 2: 80 
- Player 3: 120 – 6 = 114 
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4 Risk Attitudes and Medicare Part D Enrollment 
Decisions 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Risk preferences are crucial for understanding individual choices whenever agents make 
economic decisions under uncertainty. Consequently, the demand for insurance coverage as a 
means of reducing or eliminating uncertainty depends on the individual attitude to risk. 
Standard economic theory predicts that risk averse individuals will always opt for insurance 
when it is actuarially fair, and will generally have more insurance coverage than risk seeking 
agents. This chapter investigates the link between risk aversion and medical insurance 
coverage in the context of Medicare Part D, which was introduced in the United States in the 
beginning of 2006. It offers insurance coverage against “catastrophic” costs for prescription 
drugs and is targeted to Americans aged 65 and older.  
Since the main objective of Medicare Part D is to reduce the number of persons without health 
insurance coverage, the program is generously subsidized so that the vast majority of the 
eligible population unequivocally benefits from it. However, for individuals with currently low 
expenses for pharmaceutical drugs it may be optimal not to enroll if they expect their drug bill 
to remain low for the near future. Here is where risk aversion comes into play. Future expenses 
for pharmaceutical drugs are uncertain and current expenses or health status are only imperfect 
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indicators for the future (e.g., Winter et al., 2006; Heiss et al., 2010). This is especially true for 
people around retirement age, whose health status is likely to decline over time. One might 
therefore expect that highly risk averse persons choose to enroll even when they are still in 
relatively good health. On the other hand, individuals who perceive the risk of catastrophic 
drug costs to be tolerably small may decide to defer enrollment in Medicare Part D to a future 
date and remain uncovered for the moment. A series of papers investigate enrollment decisions 
and plan choice in Medicare Part D, but as Ketchman et al. (2011) note, little is known about 
the role of risk attitudes. 
Medicare Part D provides an excellent opportunity to study if this self-selection process is 
actually at work. In 2006, the Part D standard plan, as formulated by the Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services, had an annual premium of $444 and a deductible of $250. For 
prescription drug costs of up to $2,250 it paid 75% of the pharmacy bill. Between $2,250 and 
$5,100 there was a “donut hole” without additional benefits, but the standard plan covered 95% 
of the costs above $5,100.22 With these features, the break-even point for enrollment in 2006 
was prescription drug costs of $842. Winter et al. (2006) calculate that only 27% of the 
Medicare-eligible population fell below this level. However, because of a late enrollment 
penalty (a 1% increase in premium for each month of delay), enrollment was dynamically 
efficient even for many with a slightly lower bill. Non-enrollment was only optimal for 
currently healthy individuals who expected expenses for prescription drugs to remain low in 
the near future. Many Americans in the target population did not have to make an active 
decision because they had prescription drug coverage via their employer, which was 
automatically converted to Part D coverage. Only those who did not fall into this category had 
to make a choice of whether to enroll or not. We will refer to these persons as “active 
deciders”. A more detailed overview of the institutional features of Part D is provided for 
example in Winter et al. (2006), Duggan et al. (2008), Duggan and Scott Morton (2010), or 
Neuman and Cubanski (2009). 
For our purposes, a particularly attractive feature of the design of Part D is the late enrollment 
penalty, which ensures that hardly anybody should find it optimal not to enroll in the inaugural 
period only to obtain Part D coverage shortly afterwards. Therefore, almost everybody who 
decided not to enroll during the first six months must have done it with the expectation of 
remaining uncovered at least until the next official enrollment period. Furthermore, since 
                                                 
22 The details of the standard benefit plan are adjusted annually. For example, for 2012 the deductible has been set 
to $320 and the “donut hole” started at $2,930.  
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enrollment in a Part D plan was strictly optimal for drug costs exceeding $842 per year it 
should largely be independent of income or wealth – quantities for which it is usually difficult 
to obtain reliable information in surveys. 
In our analysis we focus on the role of risk aversion in the decision of whether to sign up for 
Medicare Part D. The determinants of enrollment in Part D have been examined by Heiss et al. 
(2010) and Levy and Weir (2010). The former study used the Retirement Perspectives Survey 
(RPS), while the latter employed the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) which is both larger 
and contains more background variables than the RPS, but is less detailed with respect to 
information related to Part D. Both studies find that current prescription drug use and poor or 
very poor self-assessed health are important determinants for enrollment. Levy and Weir also 
show that enrollment is positively related to a proxy for IQ. Apart from that, the take-up 
decision seems to be unrelated to most other background variables, in particular variables 
reflecting educational attainment, income and wealth.23  
In the analysis of insurance decisions, the role of individual heterogeneity in preferences, for 
example risk aversion, has so far often been neglected. As Amy Finkelstein commented: “An 
important direction for future work – both for Medicare Part D and for other social insurance 
programs more generally – is distinguishing between ‘true’ preference heterogeneity and 
failures of rationality” (Finkelstein, 2010). If differences in risk preferences can partly explain 
enrollment choices, this also has important implications for the benefits of allowing individuals 
to choose within social insurance. As there is also individual heterogeneity in risk perceptions, 
these need to be separated from risk aversion (Spinnewijn, 2009). In the survey from which our 
data are taken, risk preferences were elicited by means of hypothetical lotteries with an 
objectively quantifiable risk in order to eliminate differences in perceptions.    
The introduction of Part D was accompanied by the launch of the Retirement Perspectives 
Survey which surveyed a large sample of older Americans immediately before the initial 
enrollment period started on November 15, 2005.24 Survey participants were re-interviewed 
shortly after the initial enrollment period ended on May 15, 2006. The RPS contains two 
questions which are intended to reflect an individual’s attitude towards risk. One is a standard 
                                                 
23 A series of recent papers studies individuals’ plan choice conditional on enrollment (Abaluck and Gruber, 
2011a,b; Ketcham et al., 2011; Kling et al., 2011; Heiss et al., 2012). Depending on the region where they live, 
individuals who have decided to enroll can choose among around 40 different plans that differ across various 
dimensions, such as premium, copay and coinsurance regulations, and coverage in Part D’s infamous “donut 
hole”. These papers generally show that plan choices are far from optimal but the assessment of how large this 
problem is varies across these studies. 
24 https://www.cms.gov/MedicarePresDrugEligEnrol/Downloads/PDPEnrollmentGuidanceUpdateFINAL2010.pdf  
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“textbook” lottery with a 50:50 chance of winning a monetary price, which elicits the 
respondents’ willingness-to-accept (WTA) for such a lottery. The other question elicits the 
willingness-to-pay (WTP) for a hypothetical insurance against a 5% shortfall risk. These 
questions account for the different behavior of people in the gain and loss domain (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979). Our main substantive finding is that those respondents who are risk 
tolerant according to these measures were significantly less likely to enroll in Part D. 
An important survey design question is whether a general measure of risk aversion has higher 
predictive power than a context-specific measure. Our results confirm previous research which 
finds that context-specific measures are superior when employed in the context at hand. A 
special feature of the RPS which we also exploit is that both risk preference measures were 
asked in two ways: first in a bracketed format and afterwards as an open-ended question. Since 
the sample was randomly split by half into different bracketing conditions for both questions, 
this two-step procedure allows us to explore whether differential priming leads to the 
emergence of different reference points. When considering risk aversion as a potential 
predictor for enrollment into Medicare Part D we find that even minor differences in the 
priming of respondents would lead to different conclusions.  
This chapter is organized in the following way: in Section 4.2 we discuss related literature 
about the association between risk attitudes and behaviors in the health domain. Section 4.3 
presents the relevant section of the questionnaire. In Section 4.4 we explain our risk measures 
and present an overview of descriptive results and framing effects. In Section 4.5 we apply the 
risk preference questions to Medicare Part D enrollment decisions, and Section 4.6 concludes. 
 
4.2 Measures of Risk Preferences and Health Behaviors 
While the evolution of a person’s health status over time is highly uncertain, individual 
behavior can have a considerable impact upon its expected path. Economists have been 
investigating if an individual’s aversion to risk is actually reflected in a tendency to engage in 
risk reducing activities (e.g. preventive medical checks) or to avoid risk enhancing behaviors 
(e.g. smoking, heavy drinking, or consuming unhealthy food). Anderson and Mellor (2008), 
who conducted a large-scale experiment to examine the association between risk attitudes and 
risky health behaviors, show that smoking, heavy drinking, and obesity are significantly less 
prevalent among risk averse persons. They elicit risk attitudes using the procedure suggested 
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by Holt and Laury (2002).25 Picone et al. (2004) use data from the HRS and find no significant 
correlation between risk aversion and the demand for preventive medical tests. Their measure 
of risk aversion is the willingness to engage in hypothetical gambles about lifetime labor 
income. 
Dohmen et al. (2011) investigate how a self-assessed measure for risk attitudes predicts risk 
taking in different domains. They use data from the German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP) 
where respondents rated their willingness to take risks in general and in specific domains, such 
as financial investments and health, on a scale from 1 to 10. The willingness to take risks in 
general, and even more so the willingness to take health risks, is positively and significantly 
correlated with smoking, while self-reported risk taking in other domains has less predictive 
power. Heiss et al. (2011) included self-assessed risk attitude measures based on these SOEP 
questions in a predictive regression model for Part D enrollment (using a different wave of the 
dataset we analyze in this chapter) and found no significant effect.  
Related to the question of whether risk attitude is a general character trait or varies across 
domains is the study of van der Pol and Ruggeri (2008) who investigate whether an 
individual’s risk attitude in hypothetical gambles for life years differs from the risk attitude in 
quality of life gambles. They find that individuals tend to be risk averse with respect to the 
gamble involving risk of immediate death, but risk seeking with respect to other health 
gambles. 
The relationship between risk aversion and health insurance coverage was examined by Barsky 
et al. (1997) and Giuso and Paiella (2006). Barsky et al. show that the probability of being 
covered by health insurance or life insurance increases with the respondents’ aversion to risk as 
measured by the hypothetical income gambles in the HRS. In contrast, Guiso and Paiella 
(2006) obtain the finding that risk averse individuals are significantly less likely to have health 
insurance coverage. However, their measure of risk aversion is a question about the 
willingness-to-pay for a hypothetical risky asset from the Italian Survey of Household Income 
and Wealth, which has several problems. The framing in an investment context probably 
explains the excessive proportion of risk averse choices (96%). Only 3.6% of answers 
indicated risk neutrality, and only 0.55% reflected risk tolerance, which is unreasonably low 
even in financial contexts. Furthermore, while this risk preference measure can explain 
portfolio composition it probably does not accurately reflect risk aversion in non-financial 
                                                 
25 For the use in sample surveys, this procedure might be less well suited since it requires more time than what is 
usually available. 
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contexts. Finally, many respondents perceived the question as too difficult and refused to 
answer. None of these problems arises with the two risk preference measures in the Retirement 
Perspectives Survey, which will be described in the next section.  
 
4.3 The Retirement Perspectives Survey 
We use data from the Retirement Perspectives Survey which was specifically designed to study 
the introduction of Medicare Part D in 2006. The RPS was conducted in four waves in 2005, 
2006, 2007 and 2009 by Knowledge Networks, a commercial survey firm which administers a 
large panel of households. Panel members are representative for the U.S. population in terms of 
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. They are periodically surveyed via a web TV 
hardware device and receive financial rewards for their participation. The objective of the RPS 
was to collect information about the responsiveness of older Americans to the introduction of 
the new Medicare Part D program during the first months of 2006, their plan choices and their 
experiences with the program. Heiss et al. (2010) provide a detailed description of the RPS. 
The analysis below uses data from the first two waves with 2598 observations. Respondents 
were between 50 and 97 years of age at the beginning of the survey. A summary of 
demographic characteristics can be found in Appendix B, Table 4.4. For analyzing the 
enrollment decision, we only consider those 443 respondents who had to make an active 
choice. Summary statistics for this subsample are displayed in Table 4.4 in Appendix B. 
In addition to questions about Medicare Part D, health conditions and socio-demographic 
status, the RPS also contains a section on risk preferences. It includes two hypothetical lotteries 
which differ not only in probabilities and expected payoffs, but also in the context. In addition, 
one lottery is framed in terms of a potential gain, while the other is about a potential loss. This 
accounts for the markedly different behavior in situation involving gains and losses 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). In order to investigate potential bracketing effects, the sample 
is split in half and both groups received different brackets for each lottery. The relevant section 
of the questionnaire can be found in Appendix A.  
In each of the two risk preference questions the respondents had to indicate which certain 
amount would leave them indifferent with the risky lottery. The main virtue of question A1, the 
first measure of risk preference, is its simplicity. Participants were asked the following 
question: 
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“Suppose your supermarket announces that in a drawing from its customers you are the 
winner of the grand prize. This prize gives you a fifty-fifty chance of getting $10,000 or 
getting nothing. Alternately, you may choose an amount for certain rather than taking a 
chance of getting nothing. 
Please indicate for each of these amounts whether you would take it for certain (rather 
than taking a fifty-fifty chance of getting $10,000 or nothing): ” 
In question A1 a decreasing dollar sequence was presented and respondents had to decide for 
each amount if they preferred to accept this amount instead of playing the lottery. In addition, 
respondents were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. The wide brackets treatment 
presented a broader range of alternative dollar amounts ($6,500, $5,000, $3,500, $2,000), while 
the alternatives in the other treatment covered a narrower range (with amounts $6,000, $5,500, 
$5,000, and $4,500). Clearly, a person who accepts $6,500 dollars instead of playing the lottery 
but prefers the lottery for lower amounts is less risk averse than another person who finds a 
certain amount of $5,000 still better than taking a risk and playing the lottery. 
In order to have a comparable measure across treatments and to fully account for individual 
heterogeneity, participants then had to answer the same question in an open-ended format 
(question A2), i.e. they had to state the minimum amount which would just be sufficient to 
forego the lottery. The answer to this open-ended question will serve as our first risk preference 
measure. The expected value of $5,000 corresponds to risk neutrality, while a WTA below 
(above) $5,000 indicates risk aversion (tolerance). The payoffs and probabilities in this 
hypothetical lottery are easy to understand, and even people without a sophisticated 
mathematical background should intuitively grasp that the lottery pays $5,000 in expectation. 
Another feature of question A2 is that it is basically context-free.  
In contrast, the second risk measure B1 is explicitly framed in an insurance context, although 
not health-related but as an insurance against the cancellation of a holiday trip: 
“Suppose you are planning a vacation that costs $2,000 up front. There is a five 
percent chance that something will come up, and you will be unable to go. Your travel 
agent offers you insurance that will refund your $2,000 if you can’t go. 
Please indicate below whether you would buy this insurance at various costs rather 
than taking a chance: “ 
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Respondents were again assigned to two bracketing treatments. The first offered a wider range 
($40, $70, $100, $130) while the amounts in the second sequence ($85, $100, $115, $130) 
were narrowly centered around the expected value of $100. Then the same hypothetical 
situation was again presented as an open-ended question (B2), which provides the second 
measure for risk preference. Each respondent had to report her maximum willingness-to-pay 
for this insurance, and higher values represent an increasing aversion against risk.  
From a survey design perspective, a potentially useful feature of this two-step procedure is that 
it helps respondents to understand the questions by providing anchors. This probably explains 
why the nonresponse rate is extremely low (around 2.2% for A2 and 2.0% for B2).26 Other 
elicitation procedures, such as those used in Barsky et al. (1997) or Holt and Laury (2002), 
indicate a range for a respondent’s coefficient of risk aversion. While Kimball et al. (2008) 
demonstrate that one can construct a cardinal proxy from these ordinal risk aversion measures, 
explicitly taking measurement error into account, their procedure requires repeated 
observations and assumptions such as risk aversion being constant over time. Instead, the RPS 
questions directly provide a point estimate for risk attitudes. The answers to these questions are 
obviously subject to noise, but as measurement error would most likely lead to attenuated 
coefficients in our setting, the results presented in the last section can be interpreted as 
conservative estimates of the link between risk aversion and Part D enrollment. 
While several studies, for example Dohmen et al. (2011), suggest that a context-specific 
measure for risk attitude has more predictive power for actual behavior than general measures, 
some respondents might find the amounts and probabilities involved in B2 more difficult to 
process than those in A2. It is therefore difficult to form an a-priori conjecture about the 
relative predictive power of both questions. It turns out, however, that B2 contains more 
information than A2. 
 
  
                                                 
26 In comparison, the question employed by Guiso and Paiella (2006) was answered by only 3458 out of 8135 
respondents (or 42.5%). The remaining persons either reported “don’t know”, or refused to answer or pay a 
positive price for a hypothetical risky asset. 
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4.4 Construction and Properties of the Risk Attitude Measures 
4.4.1 A Framework Consistent with Prospect Theory 
Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) is the descriptively most successful alternative 
to expected utility theory. One of the key predictions of prospect theory is that individuals 
behave risk averse with respect to potential gains, but risk seeking in situations which involve a 
potential loss. As we will show in the next section, the risk preference questions in the RPS 
reveal a picture which is consistent with this theory. Respondents are generally risk averse or 
risk neutral in the supermarket lottery, but mainly risk seeking in the question about the 
hypothetical travel insurance.  
We use the following CRRA two-part power function proposed by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992) to calculate risk aversion coefficients separately for the gain and loss domain: 
𝑣(𝑥) = � 𝑥𝛼 , 𝑥 ≥ 0
−𝜆(−𝑥)𝛽 , 𝑥 < 0 
 
where x represents the potential gain or loss, and α and β are the corresponding risk aversion 
coefficients for lotteries involving gains and losses, respectively. By λ we denote the 
coefficient of loss aversion, which specifies by how much more individuals suffer from a loss 
than they would benefit from an equally large gain.27 
We calculate the coefficient α for A2 and β for B2. We do this by setting the expected utility 
of the lottery equal to the utility from the respondents’ reported certainty equivalent (the 
answers in A2 and B2). By doing this, λ cancels out and we can solve numerically for α or β. 
Calculating risk aversion coefficients instead of using the raw answers offers the advantage of 
reducing the effect of outliers but entails two minor complications. First, the power utility 
specification results in very high α for a WTA above $9,000 and a very high β for a WTP 
above $1,000. To avoid extreme outliers we therefore top-code and use the same coefficient as 
for $9,000 also for the very few even higher answers (1 person with $9,500 and 13 with 
$9,999). In the same way, we use the β corresponding to $1,000 also for three outliers (1 
person each with $1,500, $1,800 and $1,900), and drop respondents whose stated WTP is 
above $2,000, i.e. higher than the value of the trip itself. The second complication is that α and 
                                                 
27 Tversky and Kahneman (1992) estimate λ to be around 2.25. 
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β are not defined for 0. We therefore use the same coefficient as for the lowest positive amount 
($1 in both cases) also for $0 answers. We performed several robustness checks with 
alternative cutoff points and obtained very similar results. 
To ensure that our functional form assumption is not too restrictive, we perform a functional 
form test with our specifications estimated in section 4.5. We add restricted cubic splines of the 
original answers (Stata module “rc_spline” by Dupont and Plummer) but find no evidence that 
a different functional specification would be preferable.  
 
4.4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
We will restrict our analysis of the Part D take-up decision in section 5 to active deciders. In 
this section, however, we present the descriptive results for the risk aversion questions and the 
framing effects for the entire sample of the RPS. From Appendix B, which contains summary 
statistics for both samples, we see that respondents in the active deciders sample are slightly 
older on average, more likely to be female, and seem to be in better health (e.g. as measured by 
self-rated health, the reported number of prescription drugs regularly taken, and the calculated 
monthly costs for these drugs). However, with respect to most variables there are only minor 
differences between both samples. 
Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of answers to question A2. A few aspects are worth pointing 
out. Firstly, the majority of respondents make a risk averse choice. Around one quarter of 
answers indicate risk neutrality and only 11.8% in our sample are risk seeking and state a WTA 
of more than $5,000. Secondly, the expected value of the lottery is by far the most frequent 
answer. Furthermore, multiples of 1000 and 500 are focal points which attract the bulk of 
answers, especially when they were included in one of the bracketing treatments.  
In the open-ended question, all amounts between $1 and $9,999 are not unreasonable a-priori. 
While indeed nobody stated a higher value, there is a nontrivial number of $0 answers (77 
respondents, or 3.1%). Since a rational decision maker would not prefer a certain amount of $0 
to a 50:50 chance of either winning a positive amount or getting nothing, it might be tempting 
to interpret $0 answers as reflecting a WTA very close to zero and correspondingly a very high 
degree of risk aversion. However, these answers could also be motivated by an aversion against 
such gambles in general. The problem of correctly interpreting these ambiguous answers is 
inherent in this type of lotteries and has also been encountered by Hartog et al. (2002), for 
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example. However, we can employ our two-step procedure to shed more light on this issue. 
The vast majority of those with a $0 answer rejected all possible amounts in the preceding 
question, thereby indicating extreme risk aversion in the open-ended question, but a very high 
degree of risk tolerance in the bracketed question. This inconsistent pattern makes these 
answers suspicious and presumably expresses a general aversion against engaging in gambles 
of this type, rather than accurately reflecting an individual’s attitude in risky financial 
decisions. While we do not drop these answers for our analysis of the determinants of Part D 
enrollment in Section 5, our main findings do not change when we exclude these suspicious 
answers.28  
 
Figure 4.1: Distribution of Answers to Question A2 
 
 
In B2 again the risk neutral choice, in this case $100, was the most frequent answer. Figure 4.2 
shows the distribution which is truncated at 200 for expositional clarity. While many 
respondents rounded to multiples of 50, also the amounts previously seen in the bracketed 
questions ($40, $70, $85, $130) were frequently chosen. The majority of answers (54%) fall 
into the risk seeking region, which is consistent with prospect theory. However, the high 
                                                 
28 Results are available upon request. 
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proportion of risk tolerant subjects is an interesting result in the light of previous studies which 
found that framing a question in an insurance context enhances risk averse choices (see for 
example Hershey et al. 1982, or Wakker et al., 2007). 
 
Figure 4.2: Distribution of Answers to Question B2 (Truncated at 200) 
 
 
Those respondents who reported a WTP of $0 in B2 were overwhelmingly consistent in the 
sense that they had also opted for a risk seeking choice in B1. Unlike in A2, there is therefore 
no reason to find $0 answers generally suspicious, and they can be interpreted as WTP very 
close to zero (presumably everybody would buy this insurance for 1 cent). However, there are 
some problematic answers on the other end of the scale which correspond to an implausibly 
high degree of risk aversion (for some people the reported WTP for the travel insurance was 
even higher than the hypothetical value of the trip itself). Again a comparison of the closed and 
open-ended questions can help to assess the reliability of answers. Most respondents who 
stated an amount between $500 and $2000 (1.57% in our sample) were by far less risk averse 
in the preceding bracketing question, which suggests that these outliers reflect a 
misunderstanding of the question rather than extremely high risk aversion. 
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4.4.3 Framing Effects 
In order to assess whether the two bracketing conditions in A1 affect response behavior it is 
instructive to compare the proportion of rejections at the only amount included in both 
treatments, which is the lottery’s expected value of $5,000. Table 4.1 shows that 14.96% of the 
respondents in the “wide” brackets group rejected a certain payment of $5,000 in favor of 
playing the lottery, compared to 18.14% in the “narrow” brackets group. While this difference 
is small, the answers to the following open-ended question A2 show that the priming was not 
without effect. The median answer in the wide brackets treatment was $2500, compared to 
$3500 in the narrow brackets treatment (the mean was $2920 and $3202, respectively). A 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test clearly rejects the hypothesis that both samples are drawn from the 
same distribution (p-value < 0.001). 
Preceding A2 by the bracketing treatments introduces different reference points which affect 
the answers to the open-ended question. Figure 4.3 shows that while both framings exhibit 
large spikes at $5,000 and $1,000, many respondents chose one of the numbers previously seen 
in A1. 252 persons (20.1%) in the wide brackets treatment stated either $6,500, $3,500 or 
$2,000 in A2, compared to only 79 persons (or 6.1%) in the narrow brackets treatment. 
Conversely, the reference points which only respondents of the narrow brackets treatment were 
exposed to were $6,000, $5,500, and $4,500. 192 respondents (14.9%) in this group stated one 
of these amounts in A2, but only 29 persons (or 2.3%) did so in the wide brackets treatment. 
The cumulative distribution functions in Figure 4.4 demonstrate that there are some bracketing-
induced differences, especially at $2,000 and $6,000, but also at $6,500. However, bracketing 
effects are confined to the region between $2,000 and $6,500. The fraction and distribution of 
answers below or above this range are almost identical. 
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Table 4.1: Treatment Comparison of WTP and WTA Questions 
 
  
A1: WTA for supermarket lottery 
Please indicate for each of these amounts whether you would take it for 
certain (rather than taking a fifty-fifty chance of getting $10,000 or 
nothing): 
 
 wide brackets narrow brackets 
$ NO YES NO YES 
6500 10.27% 89.73%   
6000   10.86% 89.14% 
5500   16.29% 83.71% 
5000 14.96% 85.04% 18.14% 81.86% 
4500   28.81% 71.19% 
3500 36.76% 63.24%   
2000 48.44% 51.56%   
 
  
B1: WTP for travel insurance 
Please indicate below whether you would buy this insurance at various 
costs rather than taking a chance: 
 
 wide brackets narrow brackets 
$ NO YES NO YES 
40 16.19% 83.81%   
70 41.90% 58.10%   
85   33.14% 66.86% 
100 60.73% 39.27% 50.17% 49.83% 
115   66.52% 33.48% 
130 72.34% 27.66% 69.84% 30.16% 
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Figure 4.3: Answers to Question A2 by Brackets Treatments 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Cumulative Distribution Function for Question A2 
 
 Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions: p-value < 0.001 
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With respect to B2, even casual inspection shows that the treatment effect is more pronounced 
(see Figure 4.5). The fact that they saw the $85 option in B1 induces 132 persons (or 10.54%) 
of those in the narrow brackets condition to report exactly this number in B2. Another 21 (or 
1.68%) adopted the previously seen $115. In the wide treatment, both numbers were stated not 
even once. Conversely, 270 persons in the wide treatment named either $40 or $70 in B2, 
which amounts to more than 21%. In the other framing, only 0.8% chose these numbers. Both 
bracketing treatments included the expected value of $100 as a cut-off point, but while 49.83% 
would have bought the hypothetical travel insurance for this price in the narrow brackets 
treatment, only 39.27% would have done so in the wide condition (see Table 4.1). The 
inclusion of cheap alternatives ($40 and $70) clearly changes the respondents’ valuation of the 
insurance. Interestingly, there is almost no difference with respect to the fraction of answers 
above and below $130, which is the second value common to both treatments. However, the 
cumulative distribution function (Figure 4.6) reveals that bracketing-induced distortions are not 
confined to the area between 40 and 130, but rather affect the entire distribution. Those persons 
who were assigned to the narrow brackets treatment, with $85 as the lowest suggested value, 
are more likely to have a WTP below $40. The framing effect is strongest in between 40 and 
100, but there remains a difference even above 130. The treatment effect is reflected in the 
median answers to B2. While the respondents assigned to the narrow brackets state a median 
willingness-to-pay of $100, those in the wide brackets treatment are significantly more risk-
loving, with a median of $70. Again, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects that both samples are 
drawn from the same distribution (p-value < 0.001).  
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Figure 4.5: Answers to Question B2 by Brackets Treatments (Truncated at 200) 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Cumulative Distribution Function for Question B2 (Truncated at 200) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions: p-value < 0.001  
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4.4.4 Determinants of the Measures for Risk Attitudes in the RPS 
Our objective in this section is twofold. First, we want to examine whether there remains a 
significant treatment effect when we control for covariates which have been found to be 
associated with risk attitudes in other studies based on different datasets. Second, we are 
interested in whether there is a correlation between some socio-demographic covariates and the 
answers to the lottery questions. 
As shown in Table 4.2, the bracketing-induced treatment effects are also evident when we 
regress the risk preference measures (both the raw answers and the calculated risk aversion 
coefficients) on socio-demographic variables. In all regressions the treatment dummy is 
significant.  
Two further conclusions emerge from Table 4.2: First, converting the raw answers into the risk 
aversion coefficients α and β does not substantially alter the results. Second, the association 
between the risk preference measures and respondent characteristics is low, especially in the 
case of A2. This contrast with Dohmen et al. (2011) and Hartog et al. (2002), for example, who 
find that women are significantly more risk averse, and that risk aversion increases with age 
and a measure of subjective health status, while a better education level is associated with 
higher risk tolerance. Both papers also report some evidence for a positive relationship between 
income and risk tolerance. Halek and Eisenhauer (2001) as well as Donkers et al. (2001) find 
similar effects for gender and education.29 Generally we find little association between 
reported certainty equivalents and demographic characteristics. Columns (3) and (4) show that 
B2 is significantly lower for persons with education below high school level and significantly 
higher for nonwhite respondents, and that poor or very poor self-reported health is associated 
with slightly more risk averse choices. There are no significant differences across household 
income levels, but the income measure in the RPS is self-reported and neither informative 
about the source of income (e.g. labor income vs. pension income), nor about the relative 
contribution of the household members to the total household income or about how much is 
actually disposable. In contrast to the previously mentioned studies we do not find a gender 
effect. However, Schubert et al. (1999) also employ insurance-context lotteries to measure risk 
aversion in the loss domain and do not find a significant gender difference.  
                                                 
29 Surveys of evidence for gender differences in risk taking can be found in Eckel and Grossman (2008), and 
Croson and Gneezy (2009).   
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Overall, the fact that A2 is not significantly associated with any of the respondents’ 
characteristics might be indicative that it is a noisier measure than B2. On the other hand, both 
risk aversion measures might measure different aspects of risk aversion, which cannot be 
explained in the same fashion. Interestingly, within respondents α and β are virtually unrelated, 
with a correlation coefficient of -0.016 (p-value = 0.421).  
 
Table 4.2: Predictors of the Risk Aversion Measures (OLS Regressions) 
 
 
(1) 
A2 
(2) 
α 
(3) 
B2 
(4) 
β 
constant 3179.2122*** 
(132.2073) 
0.7468*** 
(0.05322) 
103.8621*** 
(6.6897) 
0.9592*** 
(0.0236) 
A1 treatment 
dummy 
-281.6155*** 
(90.8509) 
-0.0732** 
(0.0345) 
  
B1 treatment 
dummy 
  -11.7355** 
(4.6909) 
-0.0300* 
(0.0161) 
age > 75 85.3777  
(102.9833) 
0.0318 
(0.0402) 
-2.4164 
(5.2935) 
-0.0081 
(0.0193) 
education below 
highschool level 
-101.076 
(95.4555) 
-0.0220 
(0.0356) 
-12.9473*** 
(4.9274) 
-0.0421*** 
(0.0157) 
male -41.6113 
(91.2655) 
0.0013 
(0.0345) 
-2.3736 
(4.7179) 
-0.0012 
(0.0165) 
household 
income<$30,000    
-34.7375 
(110.6319) 
0.0207 
(0.0401) 
-4.8590 
(5.7066) 
-0.0150 
(0.0192) 
household 
income>$60,000 
177.6066 
(122.3170) 
0.0529 
(0.0469) 
4.3549 
(6.3902) 
0.0291 
(0.0205) 
nonwhite 145.6331 
(129.7351) 
0.0574 
(0.0497) 
18.5246 *** 
(6.4311) 
0.0580 ** 
(0.0277) 
SAH excellent 152.2851 
(191.4282) 
0.0593 
(0.0773) 
-4.1146 
(9.9175) 
-0.0138 
(0.0291) 
SAH (very) poor 24.6384 
(105.6686) 
0.0348 
(0.0409) 
10.1463* 
(5.4042) 
0.0405 
(0.0197) 
N                  2541 2541 2526 2526    
R2 0.0073 0.0039 0.0124 0.0116 
F 2.2303 1.3728 3.5012 3.5764 
Notes: Respondents with B2>=2000 were dropped. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses; 
 * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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4.5 Risk Aversion as a Predictor of Enrollment in Medicare Part D 
Out of the 2598 respondents in our sample, 443 are active deciders and had to make a decision. 
349 of them enrolled in a Part D plan, while 94 remained uncovered. Since the RPS was 
targeted at older Americans, respondents were explicitly asked if a family member had decided 
for them. Those 21 persons who reported that someone else took the decision on their behalf 
were consequently excluded.30 We also dropped 15 respondents with missing answers or a 
WTP for B2 of $2000 or higher. 
In order to uncover the role of risk aversion in the Part D enrollment process we estimate probit 
models in which we regress the enrollment decision of the active deciders on our measures of 
risk attitudes and a set of covariates. We correct for potential bracketing effects in the 
elicitation procedure by including a treatment dummy in each regression. As a measure for the 
demand of prescription drugs we use expenditures for 9 frequent symptoms, calculated by 
Winter et al. (2010). The regressions further includes dummy variables for having been 
covered by a different type of medical insurance before the introduction of Part D, age (older 
than 75 years), low educational attainment (less than high school), sex, income (dummies for 
reported income below $30,000 or above $60,000), ethnicity, and excellent and poor/very poor 
self-reported health. 
Table 4.3 presents our estimation results. Column (1) contains the coefficients of a baseline 
specification without our risk aversion measures. Not surprisingly, current expenses for 
prescription drugs are an important determinant for enrollment. We also find that respondents 
who previously had prescription drug coverage which was not equivalent to Part D coverage 
were more likely to enroll, which probably reflects a substitution of their previous insurance 
coverage towards the subsidized program. As expected, persons with excellent self-reported 
health were more likely to remain uncovered. Socio-demographic factors such as age, income, 
education, gender and ethnic background are all insignificant, which is in line with Heiss et al. 
(2010) and Levy and Weir (2010). 
Columns (2) and (3) contain estimates for the sample of active deciders using either of the two 
measures for risk preferences individually, and the regression in column (4) uses both measures 
jointly. While α has no significant influence on the probability of enrolling, β is highly 
significant. This holds regardless if β is used individually or jointly with α. Individuals with a 
higher WTP for the hypothetical travel insurance are significantly more likely to obtain Part D 
                                                 
30 All of them actually enrolled.  
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coverage. This result confirms that risk aversion is indeed an important determinant for 
enrollment in Part D.31  
A comparison of columns (3), (5) and (6) sheds more light on the effects of different 
bracketing treatments. Across all active deciders (column 3) β is a highly significant predictor 
for enrollment (p-value = 0.005). Interestingly, this result is almost entirely driven by the wide 
bracketing treatment (column 6); the coefficient in the narrow treatment is much smaller and 
far from being significant (p-value = 0.301). We also tested whether this result could be driven 
by a different composition of both subsamples, but find no evidence for a failure of 
randomization. Apart from β, there is no variable for which we can reject the hypothesis of 
identical distributions across treatments. The only exception is the proportion of respondents 
who had a different kind of medical insurance before the introduction of Part D (p-value = 
0.030). Thus, our treatment effect is not driven by non-random assignment. 
  
                                                 
31 As already mentioned in section 4.1 we tested whether a more flexible functional form would be more 
appropriate for the risk aversion measures, but find no evidence which rejects our functional form assumption.  
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Table 4.3: Determinants of Part D Enrollment (Probit Regressions) 
 All active deciders B1 narrow 
brackets 
B1 wide 
brackets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
constant 0.5054** 
(0.1969) 
0.3821 
(0.2203) 
-0.2671 
(0.3251) 
-0.4315 
(0.3438) 
-0.0609 
(0.4972) 
-0.7694* 
(0.4370) 
α  0.0697 
(0.0903) 
 0.0893 
(0.0953) 
  
A1 treatment 
dummy 
 0.1495 
(0.1492) 
 0.1572 
(0.1514) 
  
β   0.8092*** 
(0.2967) 
0.8366*** 
(0.2967) 
0.4412 
(0.4416) 
1.2542*** 
(0.4200) 
B1 treatment dummy   0.0865 
(0.1506) 
0.0883  
(0.1511) 
  
prescription drug 
expenditure in $ 
0.0032** 
(0.0013) 
0.0032** 
(0.0013) 
0.0032*** 
(0.0012) 
0.0032*** 
(0.0011) 
0.0051*** 
(0.0017) 
0.0028** 
(0.0014) 
other medical 
insurance 
0.6944*** 
(0.1716) 
0.6891*** 
(0.1717) 
0.6980*** 
(0.1735) 
0.6942*** 
(0.1741) 
0.3241 
(0.2393) 
1.1428*** 
(0.2739) 
SAH excellent -0.8050*** 
(0.2392) 
-0.8047*** 
(0.2402) 
-0.8075*** 
(0.2427) 
-0.8095*** 
(0.2447) 
-1.3441*** 
(0.3952) 
-0.2465 
(0.3639) 
SAH (very) poor -0.1719 
(0.2029) 
-0.1588 
(0.2014) 
-0.1887 
(0.2036) 
-0.1737 
(0.2021)    
0.0306 
(0.2966) 
-0.5333* 
(0.3007) 
age > 75 0.1897 
(0.1547) 
0.1887 
(0.1552) 
0.1895 
(0.1579) 
0.1876 
(0.1585) 
0.1747 
(0.2171) 
0.4180* 
(0.2506) 
education below 
highschool level 
-0.2205 
(0.1511) 
-0.2122 
(0.1504) 
-0.2198 
(0.1541) 
-0.2106 
(0.1539) 
-0.1970 
(0.2156) 
-0.0958 
(0.2352) 
male  0.0760 
(0.1530) 
0.0636 
(0.1532) 
0.1111 
(0.1544) 
0.1009 
(0.1547) 
0.4780** 
(0.2195) 
-0.0814 
(0.2291) 
household income 
<$30,000    
-0.0703 
(0.1699) 
-0.0696 
(0.1694) 
-0.0617 
(0.1719) 
-0.0636 
(0.1719) 
-0.0485 
(0.2454) 
0.0307 
(0.2624) 
household income 
>$60,000 
0.2873 
(0.2257) 
0.2930 
(0.2290) 
0.2408 
(0.2291) 
0.2434 
(0.2329) 
0.3268 
(0.3174) 
0.3215 
(0.3206) 
nonwhite 0.2967 
(0.2675) 
0.2652 
(0.2678) 
0.2642 
(0.2691) 
0.2199 
(0.2660) 
0.3014 
(0.3714) 
0.1949 
(0.3936) 
N 407 407 407 407 209 198 
Pseudo-R2 0.1282 0.1316 0.1466 0.1509 0.1962 0.1924 
Log-pseudolikelih. -187.467 -186.724 -183.506 -182.576 -92.434 -80.461 
Notes: Dependent variable = 1 if respondent enrolled in Part D, 0 otherwise. Respondents with B2>=2000 were 
dropped. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
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4.6 Conclusion 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first analysis which focuses on the role of risk 
aversion in the take-up process for Medicare Part D. We find that risk attitude for losses can 
explain why eligible persons decided not to enroll in Part D. Using the WTP for a hypothetical 
insurance from a non-health context we can show that risk tolerant respondents are indeed 
highly significantly less likely to obtain Part D coverage. Our analysis shows that together with 
low current prescription drug costs and excellent self-reported health status – two variables 
which directly reflect limited expected financial benefits associated with Part D – risk tolerance 
is the most important determinant for explaining why respondents decided to remain 
uncovered. Our analysis also shows that risk aversion is by far more important than socio-
demographic characteristics to explain non-enrollment in Medicare Part D. These findings 
underscore the importance of heterogeneity of risk attitudes in the analysis of insurance 
markets, as argued by, inter alia, Finkelstein (2010) and Spinnewijn (2009).   
From a survey design perspective, this analysis suggests a two-step procedure which provides 
anchoring values in a first step and fully exploits individual heterogeneity in the second step. 
Doing this achieves the goal of a very low non-response rate and enables us to perform 
consistency checks for questionable answers by comparing the responses from the open-ended 
and the bracket format. Whether such a two-step procedure is an efficient way to increase 
response rates and response quality in the context of a time-constrained internet survey, and 
how it compares to the same measure elicited in one step, is a question which merits further 
research.    
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Appendix A: Questionnaire Section on Risk Preferences 
 
Question A1: 
Suppose your supermarket announces that in a drawing from its customers you are the winner 
of the grand prize. This prize gives you a fifty-fifty chance of getting $10,000 or getting 
nothing. Alternately, you may choose an amount for certain rather than taking a chance of 
getting nothing. 
Please indicate for each of these amounts whether you would take it for certain (rather than 
taking a fifty-fifty chance of getting $10,000 or nothing): 
 
Wide brackets treatment: 
 No Yes 
$6,500 □ □ 
$5,000 □ □ 
$3,500 □ □ 
$2,000 □ □ 
 
Narrow brackets treatment: 
 No Yes 
$6,000 □ □ 
$5,500 □ □ 
$5,000 □ □ 
$4,500 □ □ 
 
 
Question A2: 
Still thinking about the super market prize that gives you a fifty-fifty chance of getting $10,000 
or getting nothing, as just described. What is the minimum amount you would choose for 
certain? 
Please enter the dollar amount here: $ _____________ 
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Question B1: 
Suppose you are planning a vacation that costs $2,000 up front. There is a five percent chance 
that something will come up, and you will be unable to go. Your travel agent offers you 
insurance that will refund your $2,000 if you can’t go. 
Please indicate below whether you would buy this insurance at various costs rather than taking 
a chance: 
 
Wide brackets treatment: 
 No Yes 
$40 □ □ 
$70 □ □ 
$100 □ □ 
$130 □ □ 
 
Narrow brackets treatment: 
 No Yes 
$85 □ □ 
$100 □ □ 
$115 □ □ 
$130 □ □ 
 
 
Question B2 
Still thinking about a vacation that costs $2,000 up front and assuming there is a five percent 
chance that you will be unable to go. What is the maximum amount you would pay for 
insurance that would refund the cost, as just described? 
Please enter the dollar amount here: $ _____________ 
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Appendix B: Summary Statistics for Full Sample & Active Deciders  
Table 4.4: Summary statistics: Full sample (N=2598) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Demographic Characteristics 
Age 69.96 8.06 50 97 
Age > 75  0.28 0.45 0 1 
Gender (1=male, 0=female) 0.45 0.50 0 1 
Education below highschool level  0.55 0.50 0 1 
Income < 30,000 USD 0.45 0.50 0 1 
Income > 60,000 USD 0.27 0.45 0 1 
Currently living with a partner 0.61 0.49 0 1 
Currently married 0.58 0.49 0 1 
# children > 0 0.90 0.30 0 1 
Currently working (full or part-time) 0.15 0.36 0 1 
nonwhite 0.17 0.37 0 1 
immigrant 0.04 0.20 0 1 
     
Health Characteristics     
Self-assessed health (1=excellent, 5=very poor) 2.92 1.02 1 5 
Self-assessed health excellent (0/1) 0.06 0.24      0 1 
Self-assessed health poor or very poor (0/1) 0.28 0.45 0 1 
# different prescription drugs regularly taken 1.30 1.67 0 15 
Avg. monthly prescription drug costs (USD) 120.96 162.59 0 1280 
Other type of medical insurance (unspecified) 0.74 0.44 0 1 
     
Risk Aversion measures     
A2 3063.36 2286.86 0 9999 
α 0.76 0.86 0.08 6.58 
Risk seeking for gains, i.e. A2>5000 (0/1)  0.13 0.34 0 1 
B2 120.31 345.81 0 8500 
β 0.95 0.41 0.39   4.32 
Risk seeking for losses, i.e. B2<100 (0/1) 0.53 0.50 0 1 
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Table 4.5: Summary statistics: Only active deciders (N=443) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Demographic Characteristics 
Age 72.61 6.20 64 93 
Age > 75  0.34 0.47 0 1 
Gender (1=male, 0=female) 0.38 0.49 0 1 
Education below highschool level  0.59 0.49 0 1 
Income < 30,000 USD 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Income > 60,000 USD 0.21 0.40 0 1 
Currently living with a partner 0.59 0.49 0 1 
Currently married 0.56 0.50 0 1 
# children > 0 0.91 0.29 0 1 
Currently working (full or part-time) 0.13 0.33 0 1 
nonwhite 0.09 0.29 0 1 
immigrant 0.03 0.18 0 1 
     
Health Characteristics     
Self-assessed health (1=excellent, 5=very poor) 2.70 0.98 1 5 
Self-assessed health excellent (0/1) 0.10 0.29      0 1 
Self-assessed health poor or very poor (0/1) 0.20 0.40 0 1 
# different prescription drugs regularly taken 0.93 1.36 0 9 
Avg. monthly prescription drug costs (USD) 82.46 129.75 0 795 
Other type of medical insurance (unspecified) 0.35 0.48 0 1 
     
Risk Aversion measures     
A2 2896.50 2188.44 0 9999 
α 0.70 0.81 0.08 6.58 
Risk seeking for gains (A2>5000)  0.11 0.31 0 1 
B2 107.98 277.36 0 4000 
β 0.92 0.31 0.39   4.32 
Risk seeking for losses (B2<100) 0.53 0.50 0 1 
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